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NATIONAL SECURITY 
ANDREW VERSTEIN* 
ABSTRACT 
At hundreds of companies, the government installs former spies and 
military officers to run the business without shareholder oversight, putting 
security before profits in order to protect vital projects from potentially 
treasonous influences. Through procedures I call “National Security 
Corporate Governance,” corporate boardrooms have quietly become 
instruments of national defense, marrying the efficiency norms of corporate 
law and the protective ambitions of national security. How is this achieved, 
and how successfully? Using a variety of research approaches – including 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, archival searches, telephone 
interviews, and in-person conversations with industry insiders – this Article 
illuminates a secretive government program and the challenging questions 
regarding the relationship between private ordering and public goals such 
as national security.  
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Schwarcz, and David Zaring for reading early drafts of the paper. This paper benefited from comments 
at the Southern California Business Law Workshop at Loyola University, the National Security Section 
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Litigation at Boston University School of Law. Librarians Elizabeth Johnson and Sally Irvin and student 
Dan Jouppi and others helped greatly with the research.  
This Article has benefited from numerous interviews with experts in the government, at law firms, 
and on FOCI boards. It would not have been possible without them. Only some of these conversations 
were “off the record,” but I have chosen to generally not identify sources in this text so as not to place 
undue emphasis on subjects who spoke “on the record.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central goal of corporate law is to make managers accountable to 
shareholders.1 So it may come as a surprise that the federal government 
frequently compels companies to “effectively exclude the Shareholder . . . 
from . . . influence over the Corporation’s business or management[.]”2 
Indeed, there is a federal agency whose principal work is to ask companies 
to entrench the board of directors, waive the duty of loyalty, and hire 
individuals with little business experience to run the company. 
That agency is located in the Pentagon. The managers hired and 
entrenched are former spies, military officers, and law enforcement 
officials. They take the reins from the shareholders for reasons of national 
security, at companies completing secret projects or projects vital to military 
or espionage agencies.  
This Article is about “national security corporate governance,” a 
secretive government program of repurposing corporate boards as 
instruments of national security. National security corporate governance is 
born of the need to reconcile the two conflicting logics of security and 
efficiency. The closed culture of national security stultifies creativity and 
efficiency. This is why America has long outsourced much of its defense 
preparation and production to private contractors, where market dynamics 
encourage creativity and economy.3 Yet these same market dynamics can 
undermine national security if companies feel their interests are better 
served spying on or sabotaging these important projects – perhaps because 
a major investor or another client has ties to a foreign state.  
National security corporate governance attempts to focus private sector 
dynamism onto problems of national importance, without naively trusting 
that the national interest and private interests are identical. With national 
security corporate governance, government representatives commandeer 
the boardrooms of private companies for public purposes, where they 
intercept illegal or risky plans before they become corporate policy.  
 National security corporate governance is a widespread and 
important practice. Under its ambit are some of the nation’s most pivotal 																																																								
1.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). See 
generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 
(2005) (discussing the ways in which shareholders are empowered by corporate law, and advocating for 
still more control).  
2.  DEF. SEC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAMPLE PROXY AGREEMENT, 
http://www.dss.mil/isp/foci/foci_mitigation.html. 
3.  See infra Part I.B. 
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security programs, such as civilian wiretapping 4  and the use of armed 
military contractors in combat zones. 5  Covered companies perform 5 
percent of all classified government projects. 6  They include the U.S. 
operations of household names like Rolls Royce, BAE, and Siemens. 7 
About 400 firms are currently subject to national security corporate 
governance, with one new agreement negotiated each week.8 All it takes to 
fall under its scope is a classified project and a potentially influential foreign 
client or investor.9   
The widespread use of national security governance means that the 
stakes are high. The program works by inverting the dictates of orthodox 
corporate governance wisdom. If this lowers accountability and efficiency 
at vital projects, then the nation will get far less security than it bargained 
for.10 If vital projects remain at risk, then we may have missed the chance 
to take alternative protective steps.  
The effectiveness of national security governance is not just important 
as a matter of national security; by repurposing corporate boards, it presents 
an important case study for central debates in corporate law, such as the 
appropriate degree of managerial accountability to shareholders.11 Scholars 																																																								
4.  See, e.g., Verint Systems, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) 25 (Apr. 25, 2005) (stating 
that Verint provides interception services and is subject to proxy mitigation). 
5.  See, e.g., Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating 
that defendant contractor subject to FOCI mitigation).  
6.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL 
SECURITY 9 (2015), http://www.dss.mil/documents/about/February_2015_Biennial_Report_ 
to_Congress_9MARCH2015.pdf (5.3 percent of all cleared facilities under FOCI).  
7.  SSA List, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT BLOG, https://perma.cc/5UH8-5C3W (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2017); Alex Ashbourne, Opening the U.S. Defence Market (Ctr. for Eur. Reform, Working 
Paper,  2000), https://perma.cc/QM7F-P7E5. 
8.  FOIA Response from Defense Security Service to Professor Andrew Verstein (Aug. 17, 
2015) [hereinafter FOIA Response] (on file with author) (totaling Proxy Agreements, Special Security 
Agreements and Security Control Agreements). In this article, my focus is narrower than some FOCI 
experts might infer. I exclude from discussion those firms for which a mere board resolution suffices to 
mitigate FOCI. The focus here on national security corporate governance includes only the more 
intensive mitigation efforts.  
9.  See infra Part II. 
10.  At a time of historic cuts to defense spending, national security corporate governance may 
divert resources from other security investments. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, OMB SEQUESTRATION UPDATE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2015) (describing how 2011 sequester resulted in defense budget reduction of more 
than $600 billion). See also infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
11.  Compare Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor 
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (2002) (resisting shareholder empowerment), with Bebchuck, supra 
note 1, at 851–52 (promoting shareholder empowerment). Few advocate absolute accountability, since 
there is a tradeoff between accountability and expertise. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (2002); KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). One domain for 
that debate is the appropriateness of staggered boards. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. 
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141(a) (2013); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). The FOCI board members 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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have spilled much ink debating how and whether the boardroom should 
include non-shareholder priorities, such as employee or environmental 
wellbeing.12 Although rarely discussed, national defense is a candidate for 
one of those competing priorities.13 This Article contributes to the corporate 
law literature by presenting an actual instance of low-accountability, 
multiple-mandate boards that few imagined exist. 
National security governance also bears on recent controversies in 
criminal, administrative, and constitutional law concerning the boundary 
between governmental and private action. 14  For example, should the 
government demand environmental or worker protections in connection 
with its bailout of automobile manufacturers? 15  Should companies get 
softer criminal penalties if they take a Department of Justice representative 
into the board room? 16  National security corporate governance raises 
similar questions but on a scale that is likely greater than all comparable 
programs combined.17 Thus any discussion of administrative governance is 																																																								
are like staggered board members in terms of their durability, except that FOCI directors’ term of service 
may be considerably longer.  
12.  E.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932); Stefan J. Padfield., Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015). But see Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 
1215 (1984) (arguing against voting board seats for other groups). These questions are of renewed 
interest in light of the government’s control of many financial and industrial companies during the recent 
financial crisis, which put government representatives in many company’s boardrooms. See, e.g., 
Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 309, 312 (2013); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). 
13.  For exceptions addressing national security in the governance context, see Charlie Cray & 
Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 
305, 333 (2005); Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Directors' Fiduciary Duties in 
the Context of Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 811, 867 (1990). 
14.  See infra Part IV.D.  
15.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: 
Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010); see also Sepe, supra note 12, at 312; Verret, 
supra note 12. 
16.  Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007); 
Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007); Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve 
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679 (2009); Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate 
Cooperation During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 63-64 (2007); Miriam 
Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); Veronica Root, The 
Monitor—“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014); F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & 
Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011). 
17.  The TARP bailouts resulted in some twenty-six government board appointments. Sepe, 
supra note 12. Only 108 companies have been subject to monitorships between 2008 and 2014. Jennifer 
Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution 10 (N.Y. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 16-38, 2016), https://perma.cc/4SKC-ND8K. Amtrak has 
operated for forty-five years with a nine-member board. Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. 
Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015). By contrast there are 400 companies with national security corporate governance 
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necessarily incomplete without discussion of national security corporate 
governance.  
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I describes the 
tensions—between efficient security contracting, information security, and 
industrial readiness—that lead us to try national security corporate 
governance. Special emphasis is given to the promise and peril of buying 
from firms owned in part by foreign nationals. Such firms are described in 
the law as being under foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI). 
Part II turns to the law of FOCI and its mitigation through national 
security corporate governance. This Part describes the legal basis of national 
security corporate governance, the conditions for its application, and the 
government agency overseeing it.  
Part III explores the costs and benefits of the national security corporate 
governance program. First, Part III(A) discusses the clash between national 
security corporate governance and the private ordering that corporate law 
normally prefigures. National security corporate governance requires firms 
to depart from the governance systems they would otherwise adopt. And 
there is reason to think that national security corporate governance creates 
costly inefficiencies as a result, which firms may pass on to their 
government customers.  
Second, Part III(B) assesses national security corporate governance’s 
effectiveness in addressing security risks. Although this should be national 
security corporate governance’s vindication, the results seem mixed. 
National security corporate governance helps in some ways, but it is also 
easy to point to failures. This leads to a discussion of public choice theory, 
in Part III(C). While public interest surely motivates much of national 
security corporate governance, it also empowers government officials to 
engage in rent-seeking. We are, after all, dealing with the heart of the 
Military-Industrial Complex, and it is unsurprising that national security 
corporate governance facilitates a cozy relationship between the 
government and its contractors.  
Part IV turns to theoretical and practical questions raised by national 
security corporate governance. Some questions are internal to national 
security corporate governance: given that we will sometimes use national 
security corporate governance, how can we best control and account for its 																																																								
directors. See supra note 8. And the absolute number of monitoring individuals is likely to be much 
greater in national security corporate governance, since most interventions involve installing multiple 
agents. See infra Part II.B. Excluding Amtrak board members, it might well be that ninety percent of 
government agents in boardrooms are installed through the FOCI Mitigation program discussed in this 
Article. The national security corporate governance program discussed herein contributes about three 
times as many boardroom interventions as does its better-known peer, despite going almost completely 
unnoticed. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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cost? Some questions are external to national security corporate governance 
as a practice: what does this case study teach about the proper relationship 
between national security and corporate law, and about how best to resolve 
conflicts between legal regimes? Still other questions occupy a middle level: 
what light can national security corporate governance shed on other 
questions important to scholars of national security or corporate law?  
To preview some tentative conclusions, the high cost of national security 
corporate governance makes it a poor choice much of the time. However, a 
number of contexts remain in which national security corporate governance 
may be a worthwhile policy. Indeed, it is even possible that we may wish to 
expand its utilization into new domains of domestic military contractors, 
foreign non-contractors, and domestic financial institutions. The use of 
national security corporate governance may prove interesting as a partial 
solution to problems of systemic risk created by Too-Big-To-Fail financial 
institutions.  
Regardless, it is essential that when dissonant bodies of law vie for 
priority, as do national security and corporate law here, neither controls the 
result without due consideration of the contribution made by the other. We 
have a tendency to analyze problems solely from the vantage point of the 
more pressing body of law, often national security, even though any 
totalizing approach may backfire and undermine its own goals. Study of 
national security corporate governance suggests that the best way to serve 
national security is sometimes to resist our tendency to put national security 
first.  
One caveat is in order. Research at the intersection of national security 
and corporate law is rare, 18 and no scholar has seriously engaged national 
security corporate governance before.19 This paucity of inquiry is surely 
driven by a problem that I also must address: when it comes to national 
security, research is difficult and answers can be only tentative. In the case 
of national security corporate governance, the government will not release 
a list of covered companies or the directors enlisted to these strange boards, 
nor a database of the requirements imposed. Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests are denied on the theory that spies and terrorists could use 																																																								
18.  Exceptions are rare, but they do exist. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: 
Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 928, 944 (2008). 
To be sure, numerous articles consider the nexus of national security and international investment 
openness, see infra note 103, but even these articles tend to ignore or downplay corporate law 
considerations. See infra note 241. 
19.  Indeed, this secretive program has largely eluded any attention. For a rare exception, see 
Nick Schwellenbach, FOIA Friday: Government Contractors Under Foreign Control, Ownership, or 
Influence, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), https://perma.cc/3AWP-EGNK (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2017).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
782 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:775 
 
 
 
	
such information to endanger contractors and the secrets they possess.20 It 
is not even easy to find “the law” itself, since so much of this regime is 
created through norms and private contracts, rather than codified rules and 
statutes.21 No statute refers to national security corporate governance.22 
Until 2014, neither did any administrative rule or pronouncement.23 Public 
securities filings by the affected companies give very few details. 24  
I attempt to overcome these challenges through a variety of research 
techniques, including FOIA requests, visits to the National Archives, and 
interviews with industry insiders – attorneys, government officials, 
consultants, business people, and the directors of these unusual companies 
themselves. Yet all of this work amounts to just a peek inside of a very black 
box. A fuller picture will only be possible with work by other scholars, 
journalists, and investigators.  
With so much uncertainty, it would be cavalier to draw final conclusions 
such as whether national security corporate governance is ultimately 
justified in a particular context or whether national security corporate 
governance confirms predictions made by scholars in other domains. As a 
result, the tone and ambition of the paper is intentionally more descriptive 
than normative. At the same time, it is sometimes possible to surmise 
whether particular structures are designed to lead to good results. Where 
reform is likely to make the system work better, I have tried not to leave my 
opinion a secret.  
I. CONTRACTING AND ITS RISKS 
The following Sections consider the tension between governance and 
security implicit in the military-industrial complex, particularly where 
questions of foreign ownership and investment arise. Two different 
scenarios are discussed: companies that develop or acquire secret plans or 																																																								
20.  See FOCI cover letters (on file with the author). 
21.  See infra Part II. 
22.  National security corporate governance is my term. The principal tool for its imposition, 
“FOCI mitigation,” likewise goes without mention. 
23.  32 C.F.R. §§ 117.51–56 (2017). One reference to an early FOCI program was promulgated 
in 1955, but within one year it was “decodified, but not rescinded.” See Detlev F. Vagts, The Corporate 
Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(1961). 
24.  Often, neither the contractor nor its parent company is a reporting company. Even when one 
is, they rarely mention FOCI mitigation in their public filings. A recent EDGAR search produced only 
thirty-two total filings with clear reference to FOCI mitigation, with only seven filers responsible. All 
of the filings discuss either the possibility of DSS mandating a Security Control Agreement (SCA), the 
possibility of losing government contracts, the election of directors to meet SCA requirements (without 
discussing the risks of these directors), or the necessity of obtaining approval from DSS. Overall, little 
information can be gleaned from public filings. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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technology, and so pose an “information security” risk; and companies 
whose own operations involve secrets, such that they would be difficult for 
the government to expropriate in wartime, and so pose an “industrial 
security” or readiness risk.  
 A. Information Security 
The United States has long pursued military objectives by outsourcing 
vital research and manufacturing functions to the private sector. The nation 
pays about $1 trillion per year to national security contractors and the 
agencies that oversee them.25 The Department of Defense spends more on 
contractors than all other government agencies combined.26 The American 
temperament for small government may encourage such contracting, 27 
however the legitimacy of widespread contracting surely rests on 
efficiency.28 Private firms are incentivized to improve quality and control 
costs, and they can actually respond to those incentives because they are 
comparatively free from the red tape of a government bureaucracy.29  
Using contractors means trusting them with secrets normally available 
only to the most dependable military and intelligence officials. Yet it is hard 
to trust anyone in times of unrelenting industrial espionage.30 In 2013, the 
Defense Security Service (DSS), the government group overseeing defense 
contractors, received and reviewed 30,000 reports of attempted security 
breaches from contractors possessing sensitive material.31 The number of 
attacks rose about 50 percent each year for the previous four years.32 																																																								
25.  Winslow Wheeler, America’s $1 Trillion National Security Budget, PROJECT ON GOV’T 
OVERSIGHT (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/defense-budget/2014/americas-one-
trillion-national-security-budget.html. 
26. MOSHE SCHWARTZ ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44010, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: HOW 
AND WHERE DOD SPENDS ITS CONTRACTING DOLLARS 2 (2016). 
27.  E.g., Paul C. Light, Outsourcing and the True Size of Government, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 311 
(2004) (noting efforts to reduce actual and apparent size of government through contracting); Dan 
Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 321, 329 (2004) (describing “the momentum derived from the force of personnel ceilings”). 
28.  David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2008) 
(discussing privatization on the terms of its advocates: efficiency).  
29.  See Jon D. Michaels, Running Government Like a Business . . . Then and Now, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1152, 1173 (2015) (reviewing NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE 
SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013)) (noting that red tape avoidance 
is often a “rallying cry” for privatization and business-like government).  
30.  Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2014) 
(“Cyberattacks are inevitable and widespread.”). 
31.  DEF. SEC. SERV., TARGETING U.S. TECHNOLOGIES: A TREND ANALYSIS OF CLEARED 
INDUSTRY REPORTING 70 (2014), http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2014UnclassTr ends.PDF. 
32.  Id. at 8. Capture methods vary, from theft and wiretapping to kidnapping. One popular 
technique in recent years involves fake “research” inquiries by purported scholars. Id. The contextual 
irony of this claim is acknowledged. The most important change to the landscape of industrial espionage 
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The profit motive should usually push companies to invest in appropriate 
prophylactics. Access to lucrative government projects depends on a 
contractor’s reputation for quality performance and robust internal security 
practices.33  
The government also uses public and contractual law to limit 
unauthorized disclosure by its contractors.34 It is a criminal offense to share 
prescribed information with anyone lacking appropriate security 
clearance.35 Contractors must also implement a long list of specific security 																																																								
is surely the rise of Internet-based intrusions. As recently as 2004, attacks such as phishing scams, 
malware, and viruses still amounted to only 2.6 percent of all threats. DEF. SEC. SERV., TECHNOLOGY 
COLLECTION TRENDS IN THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY 3 (2005), http://www.dss.mil/documents/2005-
technology-collection-trends.pdf. Since that time, suspicious Internet activity has become the most 
important avenue for unauthorized disclosure. See DEF. SEC. SERV., supra note 31, at 27. 
33.  As a general matter, the most efficient means of regulation will usually be to set appropriate 
penalties and then allow firms a choice of how to comply. However, there are some cases where 
oversight and mandates are appropriate. Jennifer Arlen and Marcel Kahan discuss the conditions under 
which such interventions can be appropriate in the context of corporate crime: when corporate assets are 
limited, targeted duties are needed, and especially when policing agency problems is costly. Arlen & 
Kahan, supra note 17, at 3. In their view, only when agency problems are rife, such as when they benefit 
from antisocial behavior, should prosecutors doubt that the agents of the firm will ignore the costs of 
non-compliance. By contrast, there is some concern that agents in national security companies will break 
the law because there are no agency problems and they are obeying a principal either with non-financial, 
geopolitical motives or for whom financial threats are not a deterrent.  
34.  Government contracting perennially raises the complication of government as customer and 
government as regulator. These two identities can be substitutes, as when the government seeks to 
improve prevailing wages without enacting a minimum wage by simply paying more to its contract 
workers. See, e.g., Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141–48 (2012) (requirement that federal contractors 
pay their employees at least the prevailing wage). They can be complements, allowing the government 
to pursue wearing one hat what it might not do wearing another. This complementarity is part of what 
scholars of publicization have lauded: the government can impose public values of participation, 
transparency, and accountability on private actors beyond what it could have practically achieved 
through public law. On publicization, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized 
World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006). 
 The government’s two roles can also stand at cross-purposes. Steven J. Kelman, Achieving 
Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law Concerns, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 153, 159–
65 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). Government officers acting as customers may want a 
good product at a good price, even if getting it would undercut other government policies. Military 
contract officers may prefer the cheapest or best weapons even if the supplier is more likely to share the 
technology with geopolitical or commercial foes.  
National security corporate governance raises important questions about the dynamic interplay of 
the government’s multiple identities in the contracting process, but it is beyond the scope of this Article 
to fully engage those questions. 
35.  See Trading with the Enemy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012) (criminalizing unauthorized 
transmission of defense information); Summary of Export Control Laws, UNIV. S. CAL. OFF. 
COMPLIANCE, https://perma.cc/89SQ-D3NL (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (summarizing key export 
regulations). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-681, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY: 
DOD CANNOT ENSURE ITS OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS UNDER FOREIGN INFLUENCE IS SUFFICIENT 
21 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247112.pdf (including DOD response: “[f]or [classified 
information] to be at risk, even by FOCI, cleared United States citizens have to break the law by 
providing it to unauthorized individuals”). There are also sometimes efforts to censor otherwise public 
research, such as recent studies concerning avian flu virus. Heidi Ledford, Call to Censor Flu Studies 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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protocols, including for end-of-day security checks, 36  repair of storage 
containers,37 and hand carrying of classified materials.38  
Yet, lurking in the background of these rules is a potential tragedy of the 
commons. 39  Investors may shirk on security insofar as they do not 
internalize all of the costs of a leak. 40  Contractors may prioritize only 
technical or superficial compliance with the rules, even if aware that more 
should be done to reduce risk, particularly if detection is unlikely.  
Worse still, some investors may push for non-compliance, either because 
penalties are not credible,41 or because they expect to be amply rewarded by 
another potential customer grateful for the disclosure, 42  or because a 
powerful foreign state essentially extorts favors, 43  or because the 
shareholder is myopic and anticipates immediate savings or gains from lax 
security.44 Some managers may be willing to break the law and accept 
personal risk in order to earn investors’ gratitude. Shareholders may elect to 																																																								
Draws Fire, 481 NATURE 9 (2012), http://www.nature.com/news/call-to-censor-flu-studies-draws-fire-
1.9729. Those studies, which were eventually published anyway, could ease the efforts of bioterrorists. 
See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating 
Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419 (2016) (describing recent 
expansion of trade secrecy law under rhetoric of protection and security). 
36.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 5220.22-M, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
OPERATING MANUAL § 5-102 (2006) [hereinafter NISPOM].  
37.  Id. § 5-311. 
38.  Id. § 10-405. 
39.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
40.  Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 638 
(2013) (“National security bears all the hallmarks of a quintessential public good.”); MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (1965) (“It would 
obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the military 
services . . . to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government . . . .”). 
41.  Penalties may not be credible if the government is unlikely to impose the cost. See Guttman, 
supra note 27, at 344 (“Where only a handful of contractors dominate (e.g., Boeing and/or Lockheed 
Martin), a tension exists between the principle of rewarding or penalizing performance and the need to 
assure continued availability of alternative providers. In this context, the failure, suspension, or 
debarment of a major contractor may prove unacceptable.”). Alternatively, a firm may have too little 
wealth to pay the penalty. See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986) (demonstrating that ex post liability does not provide optimal incentives when defendant’s wealth 
is less than the optimal damage award). 
42.  Sharing just a little data might secure a valuable contract from another government. A 
company nearing the end of a contract and already informed that it will not be considered for future 
projects (perhaps due to poor quality) can engage in end-game opportunism, unconcerned about the loss 
of future business.  
43.  This is not unrealistic, since America itself has played a coercive role. During the first 
invasion of Iraq, American agents were able to convince Thomson-CSF, the French manufacturer of 
Iraqi anti-aircraft systems, to provide sensitive information about those systems. This information made 
it materially easier to penetrate air defenses. MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE 
GENERALS' WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF 106 (1995). 
44.  See John Plender, Shareholder Short-Termism Is Damaging the Economy, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d583baa2-823f-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096.html. 
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the board those individuals most willing to minimize the consequences of 
their actions for themselves and for America.45  
Foreign shareholders have even less reason to worry whether their 
actions endanger the United States. Whether a sovereign wealth fund, a 
state-owned enterprise, or just a wealthy resident of another foreign 
jurisdiction, foreign investors may have geopolitical interests they hope to 
advance through their investments.46 Unauthorized disclosure of a secret 
plan or proprietary technology may directly benefit the investors’ home 
nation. That is a sensible enough reason for foreign managers and owners 
of a business to risk angering their U.S. government client.  
For foreign groups and nations, investment can be an effective 
supplement to other strategies of espionage. For example, “foreign 
contingents” are known to visit facilities and attempt “to gain access to and 
collect protected information that goes beyond that permitted and intended 
for sharing.”47 This is clearly easier if foreigners own the enterprise and can 
claim commercial motives for a visit. 
How can the sometimes-pernicious influence of foreign shareholders be 
addressed? One option is to simply limit foreign investment.48 Many nations 
draw lines around sensitive sectors. Mexico bars foreigners from owning 
minerals or coastal land. 49  China abjures overseas operation of theater 
companies and laboratories of genetically modified plant seeds.50 Yet, hard 
limits on investment may seem impractical in a world where capital is global 
and corporate nationality is fluid.51 																																																								
45.  Also, foreign ties may reduce the credibility of deterrence. If a manager breaks U.S. law, she 
may find it more convenient to flee beyond the reach of U.S. authorities, if she is just returning to the 
bosom of the corporation’s home jurisdiction (and perhaps her own). 
46.  Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: 
A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008). 
47.  DEF. SEC. SERV., supra note 31. Likewise, some mergers and acquisitions are “attempts to 
acquire protected information . . . .” Id. at 5. 
48.  We take this approach with airlines. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-34R, ISSUES 
RELATING TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL OF U.S. AIRLINES (2003), http://www.gao.go 
v/assets/100/92293.pdf. And, but for national security corporate governance, we do the same with 
defense [as the rest of this paper demonstrates], energy and critical infrastructure [Christopher S. 
Kulander, Intruder Alert! Running the Regulatory Gauntlet to Purchase, Own, and Operate American 
Energy and Mineral Assets by Foreign Entities, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 995, 1014 (2014)], and nuclear 
energy. [nuclear: p://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1503/ML15030A162.pdf; Martin G. Malsch, The 
Purchase of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants by Foreign Entities, 20 Energy L.J. 263, 264 (1999)]  
49.  Dane J. Dehler, Buying Property in Mexico's "Restricted Zone": The Missed Opportunity 
That Was the 2013 Beltrones Proposal to Amend Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, 32 ARIZ. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 310 (2015). 
50.  Rainy Yao, Update: Latest Guidance Catalogue for Foreign Investment Industries Released, 
CHINA BRIEFING (Mar. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/2JVQ-W7RV. 
51.  John J. Hamre, President & CEO, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, Public Briefing Session 
on Foreign Ownership, Control and Domination Before the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (Jan. 29, 2015), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1503/ML15030A162.pdf. (“When the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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There are also practical downsides to autarky. An unwillingness to utilize 
foreign suppliers could lead to reciprocal reluctance by other governments 
once open to American contractors.52 American shareholders will realize 
lower returns if they cannot sell their shares into the global market. 
International competition among suppliers has the potential to benefit the 
government buyer.53 Indeed, not all research takes place in America and 
excellent technology may be developed overseas – under the aegis of 
overseas investors.54 The willingness to buy, say, cockpit windows from a 
British company may improve safety for our pilots or lower costs.55 
National security corporate governance offers another way forward. 
Even where foreign investment may be nominally barred, it is common for 
the government department and the foreign investor to seek mutual 
accommodation: the transaction will be allowed, but subject to stringent 
conditions. These conditions severely limit the foreign investor’s 
prerogatives as a shareholder. In many cases, the control rights they cede 
are effectively transferred to their federal agency customer. At the extreme, 
the foreign investor is totally excised except as the occasional recipient of 
dividends. With the federal government’s own hand at the tiller, and the 
foreign investor unable to corrupt management or distort performance, the 
government can be as confident about its foreign-owned contractors as 
domestic contractors or employees of the bureaucracy.  
It is perhaps useful to think of national security corporate governance as 
a mid-point between two extremes. On one pole, the government buys from 
foreign private contractors subject to ex ante rules (contractual and 
statutory) and ex post punishments. At the other extreme, the government 
can decide that the risk of foreign-invested partners is too high and ban any 																																																								
original legislation was created that established a procedure for mitigating [FOCI] . . . the world was 
profoundly different. . . . But today we live in a world of global supply chains, international consortia of 
producers and a world of global and instantaneous communications. Capital is global and complex 
projects are funded on an international basis.”). On nationality of corporations, see Zoe Niesel, Daimler 
and the Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82 TENN. L. REV. 833 (2015).  
52.  Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge 
of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 
381, 393 (2007). Cf. Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment 
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 150 (1989) (“Exon-Florio 
creates a license for mirror proposals by other countries. . . . [T]he result may be divestment nightmares 
abroad for U.S. foreign investors based, ironically enough, on U.S. precedents.”). 
53.  And, of course, preventing “protection from unauthorized transfer of classified information 
to foreign interests [saves] billions of dollars.” National Industrial Security Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 
19,467–71 (April 9, 2014) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 117). 
54.  Id. at 19,469 (“[W]ithout this rule, Components will not have the ability to consider 
innovative technologies developed by foreign-owned U.S. companies . . . .”) 
55.  See, e.g., Gkn Aerospace Transparency Systems Inc., BLOOMBERG BUS., https://perma.cc/M 
99V-AG5B (last visited Dec. 31, 2015) (“GKN Aerospace supplies cockpit and cabin windows for . . . 
military aircraft.”).  
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foreign investment in important contractors.56 National security corporate 
governance is a third, intermediate option, akin to creating a joint venture, 
which gives the government some measure of control during the contract.57 
A joint venture structure is often an efficient way for parties to cooperate in 
a common objective despite many conflicting goals.58  
B. Industrial Security 
America has sometimes expropriated foreign-owned assets during 
wartime in order to prevent their use by the enemy and repurpose them to 
support American defense. Doing so has led to substantial transition 
problems, particularly with respect to personnel. National security corporate 
governance helps with this problem, too, easing government expropriation 
of private enterprises by assisting in succession planning. It thereby 
contributes to industrial readiness and security. 
 During both World Wars, Congress authorized mass-expropriation of 
foreign-held assets, 59  many of which were German-owned chemical 
factories.60 Seizing these properties yielded industrial capacity for the war 
effort, but presented major staffing difficulties. The executives and directors 
of seized companies had been chosen by the now-deposed foreign owners 
and were therefore potential traitors.  
 The Office of the Alien Property Custodian was tasked with replacing 
untrustworthy managers with patriotic managers. 61 Yet, as the Custodian 																																																								
56.  Indeed, the government could forswear privatization altogether and conduct the business 
within its bureaucracy. On the proper tradeoff between privatization and internal production. See 
generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003); Super, 
supra note 28. 
57.  The joint venture is not the only form of interim control. The contract or public procurement 
laws may give the government some ongoing authority. A joint venture is a form of interim control 
operating at the boardroom and governance level.  
58.  Sarath Sanga, The Contract Frontier: A Study of the Modern Joint Venture (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/201501 
04_sarath_sanga_modern_jv.pdf. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: 
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). Security promises can be hard to credibly enforce, 
especially when the contractor has overseas investors. National security corporate governance eases the 
government’s monitoring and enforcement responsibilities, permitting continued outsourcing. 
59.  Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (permitting the 
president to appoint an alien property Custodian); Exec. Order No. 9,095, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,971 (Mar. 13, 
1942) (reestablishing the office of the alien property Custodian); see also Francis X. Fallon, Jr., Enemy 
Business Enterprises and the Alien Property Custodian, I., 15 FORDHAM L. REV. 222, 224 nn.10, 14 
(1946) (some half billion dollars taken in each case). 
60.  OFF. OF THE ALIEN PROP. CUSTODIAN, ANNUAL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN REPORT 25-26 
(1919) (discussing assets taken and rise of German chemical industry). Paul V. Myron, The Work of the 
Alien Property Custodian, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 76, 81 (1945) (one third of net equity taken was 
German chemical manufacturing).  
61.  Myron, supra note 60, at 79-81. 
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told Congress, “the task of securing competent and skilled personnel under 
wartime conditions [was] difficult.”62 There was simply a dearth of patriots 
who knew much about German chemical production plants.63 In practice, 
patriotic hiring was often used as a pretext for nepotism 64 and political 
patronage.65  
Both approaches were bad for wartime industriousness.66 As a result, the 
Custodian was often forced to retain potential enemy spies and saboteurs 
just to keep the factories running. For example, at General Dyestuff, the 
Custodian ousted 80 percent of the board,67 including president and director 
																																																								
62.  OFF. OF ALIEN PROP. CUSTODIAN, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 11, 1942 TO 
JUNE 30, 1943 4 (1943); Accord STUART L. WEISS, THE PRESIDENT’S MAN: LEO CROWLEY AND 
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT IN PEACE AND WAR 146 (1996). 
63.  One internal memo about American Potash stated what was apparently a common finding, 
“The business is a highly technical one requiring the supervision of men familiar with its operations.” 
Stacey R. Kole & Harold J. Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United States, 
40 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9 (1997). 
64.  See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF WAR, 1941–1945 
10 (1967) (White House counsel and former judge Samuel Rosenman describing one conversation with 
Custodian Crowley: “Crowley comes in . . . and says to me, ‘By the way, Judge, I need a couple of good 
businessmen for Aniline Dye and if there are any friends of yours that you would like me to put in there, 
just let me know’ . . . It’s just like offering me a bribe.”). A particularly egregious example, the third 
Custodian was jailed for selling expropriated companies back to their German owners in exchange for 
colossal bribes. Miller v. United States, 24 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1928) (alleged bribe worth $500,000). 
That payment would be worth nearly $10 million in 2017 dollars. 
As another example, one magnate was appointed to the board of two of his expropriated competitors 
– promptly after he hired the Custodian to run a utility company (concurrently with his government 
office) at a salary that would be worth more than $1 million today. ANTONY C. SUTTON, WALL STREET 
AND THE RISE OF HITLER (1976). For a biography of the magnate, see JOHN N. INGHAM, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS 345 (1983) (describing Victor Emanuel). 
65.  STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL PALMER: POLITICIAN 128-35 (1963) (Custodian Palmer 
gave fellow members of the Democratic Committee jobs as counsel for a textile company and vice-
president of a shipping line). 
66.  One report found that many expropriated companies grew more slowly than privately owned 
chemical companies. GAF Corporation—Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, 
Background Information on GAF Corporation, REFERENCE FOR BUS., https://perma.cc/TE9H-JGA8 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017). At a time when demand for chemical products was booming, government-
run chemical companies were hampered by a lack of expertise. Junius B. Wood, Public Ownership at 
Work, NATION’S BUS., Apr. 1952 at 39, 97 (finding that government-operated companies’ profits did 
not keep pace with privately run companies). Cf. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 216-17 (14th ed., John Murray 1931) (1873) (describing failures 
of the government-appointed head of the Bank of France). 
The loyalty/competence dilemma is by no means limited to the twentieth century or to chemistry 
knowledge. It is apparent that efforts to replace Sadam Hussein loyalists with more trustworthy officials 
resulted in a decline in quality administration. See generally MIRANDA SISSONS & ABDULRAZZAQ AL-
SAIEDI, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, A BITTER LEGACY: LESSONS OF DE-BAATHIFICATION 
IN IRAQ (2013), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-
ENG.pdf. 
67.  Elimination of German Resources for War: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Military Affairs, 79th Cong. 887 (1945) [hereinafter Elimination of German Resources]. 
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Ernst Halbach, after determining that he “had been a cloak for the enemy.”68 
The company promptly stumbled due to the “incompetence of the present 
[i.e. new] officers and directors. . . .” 69 The Custodian soon acknowledged 
the need for a “special consultant” and appointed an expert manager – 
enemy agent Ernst Halbach!  
Soon, Halbach was the “indispensable man” at the company again,70 
acting as the functional top executive and earning even more than the 
CEO.71 Three years later, Congress demanded an explanation for why the 
Custodian had hired and retained Halbach despite its own determination that 
he was untrustworthy. The nominal CEO wrote in reply that Halbach’s 
departure would “adversely affect the war effort . . . .”72  
This incident at General Dyestuff was by no means unique. “Enemy 
sympathizers were often retained at firms that manufactured products 
deemed vital to the war.” 73 The government was apparently willing to risk 
sabotage and espionage in order to maintain industrial readiness.74 
In 1946, the Custodian’s work was brought within the Department of 
Justice, 75  but its problems left an impression in law and policy. 76  In 																																																								
68.  Halbach v. Markham, 106 F. Supp 475, 477 (D.N.J. 1952); Accord WEISS, supra note 62, at 
143 ("the board was charging . . . that Halbach was a German agent; and Crowley had lent credibility to 
the charge, if indeed he did not originate it"). 
69.  WEISS, supra note 62, at 143. Halbach was replaced by Louis Johnson, perhaps at President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal suggestion. Johnson was once Assistant Secretary of State, currently 
the founder and head of the growing law firm Steptoe & Johnson, and would one day be Secretary of 
Defense. KEITH D. MCFARLAND & DAVID L. ROLL, LOUIS JOHNSON AND THE ARMING OF AMERICA 
128 (2005). Though credentialed and connected, he was no expert in the chemistry or business of 
dyestuffs. 
70.  WALTER L. HIXSON, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II: THE UNITED STATES 
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 299 (2002). Accord Elimination of German Resources, supra note 67, at 
887 (Custodian stating that General Dyestuff “could not dispense with [Halbach’s] experience in the 
business.”); SUTTON, supra note 64, at 153 (CEO Johnson writing that the board “would have been lost 
without Mr. Halbach’s knowledge.”). 
71.  SUTTON, supra note 64, at 153. CEO Johnson, however, did just fine. Johnson’s salary was 
$50,000, or just under a $ 1 million in today’s dollars. MCFARLAND & ROLL,  supra note 69, at 127–28.  
72.  Accord Elimination of German Resources, supra note 67, at 887.  
73.  Kole & Mulherin, supra note 63, at 6. 
74.  See EDWARD S. MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE: CARTELS & COMMODITY 
AGREEMENTS 11 (1946) (arguing that the dearth of chemical expertise among Americans led to 
excessive partnerships with German individuals and organizations, assisting in German’s rapid re-
militarization after WWI). 
75.  Exec. Order No. 9,788, 11 Fed. Reg. 11,981 (Oct. 15, 1946). 
76.  Cf. Vagts, supra note 23, at 1522 (“When the United States vested the property of nationals 
of Germany and its allies in the two world wars, it determined never to permit the return of this industrial 
potential to German or other foreign hands.”). As with all present Outside Directors, the Custodian’s 
directors retained their ordinary fiduciary duties while also gaining a consultative responsibility to the 
government. 
Directors designated by the Custodian have the same duties and responsibilities as the directors 
of any other corporation. Due to the nature of their appointment, however, they may consult with 
the Custodian's office regarding the policies of the Custodian with respect to the business. In 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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wartime, America may expropriate foreign enterprises. Doing so will force 
a choice between experience and patriotism – between industrial readiness 
and industrial security—unless trustworthy Americans are given 
opportunities for experience during peacetime.  
National security corporate governance provides a platform for such 
advancement. Complying firms install numerous former intelligence and 
defense officials at the highest levels of operation at the companies most 
likely to face expropriation: foreign-owned firms that provide functions 
useful to America’s espionage or military efforts. From the 1950s onward, 
77 U.S. policy has been to ensconce patriotic Americans within foreign-
owned enterprises, where they could build expertise and familiarity in 
peacetime to be deployed rapidly in wartime.78  																																																								
some cases if the activities of such an enterprise are vital to the war effort, field representatives 
of the Custodian's office are placed in positions in the enterprise so that they may inspect and 
examine into its activities and make reports thereof to the Custodian. 
Myron, supra note 60, at 8.  
77.  As an early version of the National Industrial Security Program, the 1955 rules foreshadow 
each aspect of the NISPOM, including nascent elements of the FOCI mitigation rules that would be 
made explicit only later. “Foreign-owned, controlled, or influenced” facilities are deemed ineligible for 
any security clearance. Armed Forces Industrial Defense and Security Regulations, 20 Fed. Reg. 6,770, 
6,778 (Sept. 15, 1955). A number of criteria, all of which would be familiar to current defense 
contractors, are listed that serve to identify FOCI. Id. at 6,786. There is no explicit reference to national 
security corporate governance, but there can be no doubt that the criteria served as a road map to 
contractors wishing to retain their security clearance while taking on a foreign investor. Such a contractor 
would wisely sterilize “[c]ontrol by foreign interests over appointment and tenure of the officers, 
directors, or principal supervisory management personnel.” Id. at 6,785. It would be smart to modify 
“[t]he corporate structure of the company, to include such matters as . . . trust arrangements, proxies and 
the like.” Id. 
78.  Despite the predominant focus on information security in the NISPOM, the 140-page 
document setting out our military contract regime, there are exactly six instances in which the document 
points to some other goal. All of those references are in the five pages NISPOM devotes to FOCI 
mitigation (i.e. national security governance), suggesting that the program serves some other purpose 
than information security. NISPOM, supra note 36, §§ 2-300(a), 2-300(f), 2-302(a)(2), 2-302(c), 2-
306(c). In those sections, reference is made to minimizing activities that “may adversely affect the 
performance of classified contracts.” Id. § 2-300(a). Similar language, evidencing concern for priorities 
apart from information security, can be traced back to the 1955 rule, which states three goals: preventing 
unauthorized disclosure, sabotage, and “any other act detrimental to the security of the United States.” 
Armed Forces Industrial Defense and Security Regulations, 20 Fed. Reg. at 6,780.  
Earlier seeds of national security governance can be traced to secret inter-department discussions in 
1949, led by then-director of the Office of Alien Property (and soon after, federal circuit judge) David 
L. Bazelon. Reflecting on the failures of the alien property Custodian, the group considered reorienting 
foreign asset control to de-emphasize the seizure of ownership and greatly increase the use of non-
ownership control arrangements: assets would be “supervised by supervisors appointed by and pursuant 
to . . . the agency or Department administering the program. The proposed program would make 
extensive use of supervisory authority.” Memorandum from Donald Sham to David L. Bazelon, Dir., 
Office of Alien Prop. 2 (Feb. 25, 1949) (copy on file with author). The preference for supervisory 
authority rather than outright ownership is consistent with the privatization trend in both contracting and 
in national security governance control over contractors.  
James Harris, former Assistant General Counsel at Defense Security Service, deserves thanks for 
suggesting this line of inquiry. 
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II. NATIONAL SECURITY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN OPERATION 
The last Part explained the reasons why it might sometimes be sensible 
for the government to acquire influence over the board of foreign-owned 
contractors. As a result, contractors with foreign investors are often 
subjected to substantial intrusions into the logic of corporate law in the name 
of national security. This Part describes the law of national security 
corporate governance, the scope of companies subject to national security 
corporate governance, and the government officials in charge of 
administering national security corporate governance.  
A. Who Implements National Security Corporate Governance? 
The governance modifications used to reconcile national security with 
other values are implemented by the Defense Security Service (DSS), a 
division of the Department of Defense, and are mostly applicable to military 
contractors with some degree of foreign ownership.79 Foreign Ownership, 
Control, or Influence (FOCI) is the phrase used to describe potentially 
problematic foreign connections which may require mitigation through 
national security corporate governance.  
No statute refers to FOCI mitigation or national security corporate 
governance. 80  Until 2014, neither did any administrative rule or 
pronouncement. In a sense, national security corporate governance emerges 
from the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual 
(NISPOM), a document produced by the Department of Defense to clarify 																																																								
79.  There are seven important contexts in which a federal agency may regulate foreign 
ownership or influence. Of these, DSS is the main gatekeeper for three contexts: where a company’s 
business is subject to security and export controls; where there might be influence upon the nation’s 
communications security systems; and where a company is performing executive contracts, which 
includes contracts with the Department of Defense pertaining to the U.S. armed forces. Collectively, 
DSS is annually overseeing some 13,000 entities on behalf of thirty agencies.  
The remaining national security corporate governance authority is dispersed among three other 
agencies, but they follow reasonably similar procedures. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
maintains its own national security corporate governance regime (Negation Action Plan, or NAP) for 
ownership of nuclear power plants. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.38 (2017) (providing that foreign owned, 
controlled, or dominated (FOCD) persons cannot operate a nuclear power plant in the United States). 
While the NRC recently ruled that 100 percent foreign ownership would be per se unacceptable, Calvert 
Cliff’s Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), it 
is more common for the NRC to implement mitigation procedures. The Department of Energy vets its 
own contractors for classified projects and projects, but mitigates them subject to the same rules used by 
DSS, 10 U.S.C. § 2536 (2012) (adopting NISPOM), while also imposing supplemental requirements for 
DOE-specific assets, restricted data, special nuclear material, and certain other security activities. U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, MINOR CHANGE TO DOE O 470.4B, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM,  app. B, 
§ I, ch. I, at I-1. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence serves as the fourth “cognizant 
security agency” in charge of administering some FOCI mitigation. 
80.  See infra Part II. 
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its expectations of contractors, pursuant to an executive order of President 
George H.W. Bush.81 While the NISPOM is important, 82 it is neither a 
complete statement of contractors’ duties nor the proximate legal source of 
them.  
In NISPOM’s shadow, the rules are made contractually. The 
requirements of the regime are whatever DSS currently demands. DSS posts 
a template FOCI mitigation agreement on its website but one DSS contract 
negotiator told me that the “real” template is the one that he maintains on 
his personal computer and sends to companies considering national security 
corporate governance. 83  With so little public and so little fixed, it is 
impossible for any researcher to learn all the basic facts about national 
security corporate governance and the FOCI mitigation program.84 With 
those caveats, the national security corporate governance regime looks 
something like this. 
National security corporate governance is often required of defense or 
intelligence contractors that receive foreign investment or are otherwise 
subject to foreign influence.85 A company is considered to be under “foreign 
ownership, control, or influence” (FOCI) if a foreign interest can “direct or 
decide matters affecting the management or operations of that company in 
a manner which may result in unauthorized access to classified information 
or may adversely affect the performance of classified contracts.” 86  A 
“foreign interest” is any foreign government or its agent, or any entity 																																																								
81.  Exec. Order No. 12,829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,479 (Jan. 6, 1993); see also, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (1998), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap 
/dars/dfarspgi/current/. 
82.  Dan Velez, 4 Steps Contractors Should Take Now to Prepare for New Security 
Requirements, WASH. TECH. (May 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/M7V3-JN7B (calling NISPOM “the bible 
for any defense contractor supporting classified government programs”). 
83.  Even this template should not end our inquiry, since we do not know the myriad 
modifications that are made to accommodate particular companies. However, one DSS official asserted 
to me that the practical problem of enforcing so many agreements with so few government agents creates 
a strong presumption against modification. Nearly everyone outside of the government with whom I 
spoke complained of rigid adherence to form documentation as a source of frustration.  
84.  The difficulty of learning the law in this area is ironic. While we sometimes tolerate secret 
laws, see Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. L. J. 241 (2015), 
the typical justification for secret laws is to prevent strategic behavior by those subject to the law. That 
rationale is inapplicable here, since the contractors subject to national security corporate governance 
know the current state of the law. Only researchers and the public have difficulty learning about the 
regime.   
85.  Although much of the DSS regime clearly contemplates foreign purchases of equity stock, 
the forgoing definition covers more than foreign shareholders. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(1) (2017) (Stating 
that power may be “direct or indirect (whether or not exercised, and whether or not exercisable through 
the ownership of the U.S. company's securities, by contractual arrangements or other means.”). Accord 
32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(4)(ii) (2017) (discussing mitigation when FOCI is “present, but unrelated to 
ownership”).  
86.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-300(a).  
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incorporated outside of the United States, or a person who is not a U.S. 
citizen or national.87  
Three considerations inform DSS assessment of the presence of FOCI 
and its intensity:88  
(1) Investor factors, such as “the political and military relationship 
between the United States Government (USG) and the government of the 
foreign interest,”89 whether the investor is itself a government.90  
(2) Investment factors, including any capacity to influence operations 
or management of the investee company,91 such as the “nature[] and extent 
of FOCI,”92  and the size of the foreign investor’s stake.93  Five percent 
ownership or 10 percent voting interest are important but non-dispositive 
thresholds.94 
(3) Investee (i.e. contractor) factors, including current management 
roles at the contractor held by non-U.S. citizens, 95  current revenue 
generated from foreign business, 96 compliance with U.S. laws and other 
contracts, 97  complicity in past espionage98  and unauthorized technology 
transfers,99 and the sensitivity of the information to be accessed.100  																																																								
87.  Id. app. C, at C-3. 
88.  These considerations are often made into a seven-factor test. Id. § 2-301(a)–(g). It is the 
author’s decision to group them in this way.  
89.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(F) (2017). 
90.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(G) (2017); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2536 (2012) (barring foreign 
governments from receiving Department of Defense contracts involving access to proscribed 
information unless the Secretary of Defense grants a waiver). But see 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(11)(ii) 
(2017) (bypassing waiver requirement if the company is subject to a Proxy Agreement or a Voting Trust 
agreement).  
91.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(H) (2017). 
92.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(E) (2017). 
93.  Current regulations require extensive disclosure of a contractor’s ownership composition, or 
the ownership of funds that in turn own the contractor. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(v) (2017). In some 
cases, it will be hard to determine precisely who owns a given company. For example, a company may 
have no idea as to the beneficial owners of a hedge fund holding large amounts of its stock. While fund 
clients are often accustomed to anonymity, Joseph D. West et al., National Security Implications of 
Foreign Investment in U.S. Government Contractors/Edition II, BRIEFING PAPERS, Mar. 2014, at 12, 
DSS is likely to assume the worst if the company cannot or will not discover and disclose this 
information. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(2)(v) (2017). 
94.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-301(d). Important lines are also drawn at majority ownership.  
95.  Id. § 2-302; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STANDARD FORM 328, CERTIFICATE PERTAINING 
TO FOREIGN INTERESTS (2008) (item (4)). 
96.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-302; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STANDARD FORM 328, 
CERTIFICATE PERTAINING TO FOREIGN INTERESTS (2008) (must report if more than 5 percent or 30 
percent of investee’s revenue or net income comes from a single foreign person or foreign persons in 
the aggregate, respectively.). 
97.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(C) (2017). 
98.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(A) (2017). 
99.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(B) (2017). 
100.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(i)(D) (2017). 
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These are similar factors to those that prompt review by the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), another government 
group charged with regulating foreign investments.101 CFIUS has garnered 
far more media attention 102 and scholarly commentary, 103  but national 
security corporate governance is no less important. National security 
corporate governance is frequently the main driver for CFIUS policy: 
CFIUS learns about many cases as a result of the national security corporate 
governance and FOCI mitigation process;104 successful national security 
corporate governance strips CFIUS of any authority;105 and when CFIUS 
does act, it frequently imposes the existing plan of national security 
corporate governance in duplicate. 106  The national security corporate 
governance regime also predates meaningful CFIUS review by many 
decades. 107 Thus DSS’s determination is often the most important one for a 
contractor and its investors.  																																																								
101.  See Joseph D. West et al., A Dealmaker’s Guide to National Security Implications of Foreign 
Investment in U.S. Government Contractors, BRIEFING PAPERS, June 2015, http://www.gibsondu 
nn.com/publications/Documents/West-Lee-Fernandez-Farr-National-Security-Implications-of-
Foreign-Investment-in-US-Govt-Contractors-BP-15-7.pdf (explaining the CFIUS process). 
102.  Opinion, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Wind Farm: Did Obama Abuse a Security Process to Kill 
a Chinese Investment for Political Reasons?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444223104578034791978586734. 
103.  See, e.g., David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
81 (2009); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National 
Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801 (2011). Given limited bandwidth for these issues, 
excellent discussions of CFIUS may even distract from the study of national security corporate 
governance. See, e.g., David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
81 (2010)(describing Thomson bankruptcy by reference to In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996), without mentioning FOCI mitigation, DSS, or national security corporate governance). 
Contractors must notify DSS if they come under FOCI and potentially begin mitigation, while 
notification of CFIUS is voluntary. The Department of Defense (DSS’s parent agency) serves on CFIUS. 
Thus, many transactions that might “‘pass’ under the radar” attract CFIUS’s attention only if DSS has 
concerns about FOCI. Daniel C. Schwartz, Navigating the National Security Challenges Posed by 
Foreign Investment in U.S. Businesses, in RECENT TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 25 (2015). 
Accord NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-310 (providing that a government agency should recommend full 
CFIUS review if the contractor is unable to agree to and honor a FOCI action plan).  
Relatedly, the number of FOCI cases seems to be growing both nominally and as a percentage of 
CFIUS cases. 
104.  A Q&A with the Director, Industrial Security Field Operations, DSS ACCESS (Def. Security 
Serv., Washington, D.C.), 2013, at 10, http://www.dss.mil/documents/about/DSS_ ACCESS_Vol_2_Is 
sue_1.pdf (DSS Director of Industrial Security Field Operations Richard Lawhorn noting that due to 
increased globalization almost every information systems security professional has to deal with a FOCI 
firm). 
105.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(14)(iii) (2017) (“The CFIUS review and the DSS industrial security 
review for FOCI are separate processes subject to independent authorities, with different time constraints 
and considerations. However, CFIUS may not mitigate national security risks that are adequately 
addressed by other provisions of law.”).  
106.  Cf. West, supra note 93, at 10. 
107.  Compare Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975) (establishing earliest 
version of CFIUS), with Exec. Order No. 10,865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1,583 (Feb. 24, 1960) (establishing 
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If DSS determines that a company is under foreign influence, the 
influence must be mitigated, or else the subject firm loses its ability to work 
on sensitive government projects.108 When facing an investment from a 
foreign interest, contractors must notify DSS as to the type of transaction, 
and the identity of the investor, and a plan to mitigate the investor’s 
influence.109 This begins the negotiation between the company and DSS as 
to what sort of national security corporate governance will actually be 
acceptable.110  
 
B. What Does National Security Corporate Governance Entail? 
Efforts to mitigate FOCI can be grouped into two general types: 
operational and governance. Although both are common and important, this 
Article only refers to “national security corporate governance” when some 
form of governance intervention occurs.  
Operational responses dictate how the company operates on a daily basis. 
Consider the two major categories of operational mitigation: 
• Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Physical Partition: The 
contractor must “be organized, structured, and financed so as to be capable 
of operating as a viable business entity independent from the foreign 																																																								
industry information safeguards), and 32 C.F.R. § 72.2-300 (1955) (denying defense contracts to 
unmitigated foreign-influenced firms). And the modern CFIUS regime¾the one capable of actually 
impacting foreign investment¾is really a product of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
of 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5315 (2012), 31 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (2012)). From the 1950s until the 1984 advent of the Special Security Agreement, mitigation was 
available on an ad hoc basis. See Special Security Agreements Permit Foreign-Owned U.S. Firms to 
Perform Classified Defense Contracts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 101st Cong. 1 
(1990) [hereinafter H. Comm. on Armed Servs.] (statement for the record of the General Accounting 
Office, National Security and International Affairs Division), https://perma.cc/T7TR-4STK. Thus, the 
earliest version of FOCI mitigation likely predates meaningful CFIUS oversight by fifty years. 
108.  To work on classified contracts, companies must obtain facility security clearance (FCL), 
NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-100, which is an “administrative determination that, from a security 
viewpoint, a company is eligible for access to classified information of a certain category (and all lower 
categories).” Id. app. C, at C-3. To get or keep this clearance, a “company must not be under FOCI to 
such a degree that the granting of the FCL would be inconsistent with the national interest.” Id. § 2-
102(d); 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(2)(i) (2017). If the investment is made before acceptable mitigation, then 
DSS will invalidate the company’s clearance. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(2)(iv) (2017). Apart from 
mitigation or loss of clearance, a third interim possibility is that the company dispute the determination. 
32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(3)(iii) (2017). It is not feasible to determine whether disputes are common or how 
they are resolved, but it seems unlikely that firms litigate against their customers with great frequency. 
DSS therefore imposes restrictions as a de facto condition of remaining in business. Similar 
arrangements have been explored with respect to other agencies. See supra notes 25–38 and 
accompanying text; Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015). 
109.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-302(b). The discussion will usually be led by the company’s 
Facility Security Offer (a required position in companies with security clearance) and the DSS field 
officer, though both may eventually discuss matters with superiors at their respective organizations. 
110.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(2)(vi) (2017); West et al., supra note 101 (explaining that the initial 
plan leads to subsequent discussions).  
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owner.” 111 FOCI companies are discouraged from sharing services and 
physical locations with their parent company and must file plans spelling 
out which interactions are permitted and how their risks will be 
controlled.112 They must not share essential IT services.113  
• Management Committee: The contractor must establish a 
Government Security Committee (GSC), composed of those senior 
management and directors with security clearance.114 This committee is 
tasked with security compliance and must keep the DSS apprised of the 
company’s level of compliance, changes to security procedures, any failures 
to comply and subsequent preventative efforts, changes in key officers and 
directors and the reasons therefore, 115  and changes in organizational 
structure, including impending mergers and acquisitions.116 
Operational mitigation can be intrusive.117 After all, economies of scale 
and scope underlie many business combinations. Yet, a large enterprise will 
often have to partition off its government contracts into a separate 
subsidiary and limit the information flow normally essential to effective 
management118 and enterprise-level synergies119 – to say nothing of adverse 																																																								
111.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-303(b)(2) (listing independence requirement for VTA and PA). 
112.  Facilities Location Plan, DEF. SECURITY SERV., https://perma.cc/329V-U7NU (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2017); DEF. SEC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 19TH ANNUAL FOCI CONFERENCE (Apr. 14, 2015) 
[hereinafter FOCI CONFERENCE], http://perma.cc/2H4S-47PR (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“Sharing a 
service always presents FOCI risk, however unlikely, because any sharing allows the parent/affiliates to 
have a certain degree of leverage over the cleared company, thereby affecting the company’s 
independence.”).  
113.  DEF. SEC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OUTSIDE DIRECTOR AND PROXY HOLDER TRAINING: 
MODULE 2: MANAGING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR INFLUENCE (FOCI) MITIGATION 6 (Feb. 
2014),https://web.archive.org/web/20170119040444/http:/www.dss.mil/documents/isp/OD_PH_Traini
ng_ Module_2.pdf. 
114.  NISPOM, supra note 36, §§ 2-303(c); 2-306(a). The “senior management officials” are the 
Facility Security Offer and at least one other individual. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(6)(i)(A) (2017); Note 
that the GSC must also include at least two directors who possess of security clearances. DEF. SEC. 
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAMPLE SECURITY CONTROL AGREEMENT § 2.2.1 (2006) [hereinafter 
SAMPLE SCA], http://www.dss.mil/isp/foci/foci_mitigation.html. 
115.  E.g., DEF. SEC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAMPLE SPECIAL SECURITY AGREEMENT § 
9.02(d) (2006) [hereinafter SAMPLE SSA], http://www.dss.mil/isp/foci/fo ci_mitigation.html.  
116.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(10)(ii)(E) (2017). 
117.  One director told me that his $2 billion firm needed to spend $30 million to make sure that 
one of its non-classified contracts did not indirectly undermine its classified contracts. To this, a senior 
DSS official said, “It would have cost you $2 billion to be non-compliant.”  
118.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure, 8 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
(1995); Stewart A. Baker et al., Navigating Joint CFIUS and DSS Jurisdiction, STEPTOE & JOHNSON 
LLP (Mar. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/283P-MW56 (“A common strategy is to designate a cleared 
subsidiary to perform all work requiring classified information . . . However, [the government] . . . may 
try to push sensitive non-classified products into the subsidiary.”). 
119.  FOCI CONFERENCE, supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
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tax consequences. 120  Some operational restrictions also have important 
governance consequences. The GSC is in some ways a “shadow board” that 
operates the company with the government in mind.  
Despite the importance of operational mitigation, governance mitigation 
is potentially more transformative.121 To understand the drama of national 
security corporate governance, it helps to focus on the three main character 
archetypes it introduces: Outside Directors (government representatives), 
inside directors (foreign investor representatives), and proxy holders 
(government representatives). Governance mitigation largely consists of 
increasing the ratio of government representatives to shareholder 
representatives on the board. If the risk is great enough, the board can 
consist of only government representatives.  
1. Outside Directors 
Complying companies are often required to recruit one or more “outside” 
directors to the board. An Outside Director “acts on behalf of the US 
government.”122 The mitigation agreement asserts that it preempts any state 
law fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders that Outside 
Directors would otherwise owe.123 Instead, they may satisfy those duties 
only “in a manner believed to be in the U.S. national interest.”124 This 
mandate differs from the typical charge of a corporate director. 125 In theory 																																																								
120.  Melvin Rishe, Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence: The Implications for United States 
Companies Performing Defense Contracts, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 143, 170-72 (1990) (describing tax 
consequences of Voting Trust and Proxy Agreement, including possible loss of consolidated filing). 
121.  The greater impact of governance mitigation is why I have reserved the term “national 
security corporate governance” for cases where board-level changes take place. Even if these changes 
are voluntarily accepted, they are still significant if they impair the performance of the government 
contract. In some cases, almost no modification to board structure or conduct will be required. A mere 
board resolution will suffice, affirming the company’s duties and promising that no unauthorized 
influence or disclosure will flow to the foreign investor. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(4)(iii)(A) (2017). This 
article does not address board resolutions directly, and any numerical assertions (except for the number 
of FOCI agreements per week) about FOCI exclude board resolutions. 
122.  CTR. FOR DEV. OF SEC. EXCELLENCE, UNDERSTANDING FOCI STUDENT GUIDE mod. 5, at 4 
(2016), https://www.cdse.edu/documents/student-guides/understanding-foci.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2017). 
123.  DEF. SEC. SERV., INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL AGREEMENT TEMPLATE § 1.01(f) (2015) 
(on file with author).  
124.  Id. Accord DEF. SEC. SERV., GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTEES, PROXY HOLDERS AND OUTSIDE 
DIRECTORS 2 (2009), https://perma.cc/VHU7-XACV. (“Outside Directors are expected to represent the 
national security interests of the United States. The primary responsibility of the OD position is to help 
ensure that the Facility implements all needed procedures and organizational changes pertaining to the 
security and safeguarding of classified and export controlled information.”). 
125.  Waiving the duty of care is not unusual, but conditioning other duties such as loyalty is 
unusual. Furthermore, many companies indemnify directors, but covered companies push the envelope 
by advancing all fees and costs of litigation. SAMPLE SSA, supra note 115, § 4.02.  
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at least, directors would be legally bound to pursue a strategy that trivially 
improved national security even at outrageous expense to the company.  
The choice of the Outside Director is up to the investors, but DSS must 
approve. 126 Outside Directors must be U.S. citizens with personal security 
clearances,127 and no prior ties to the company.128 The individuals selected 
for an Outside Director role usually possess sterling intelligence or military 
backgrounds, though some private contractors with compliance experience 
are also elevated.129 Companies think that nominating former admirals and 
intelligence directors will ensure DSS’s approval.130 
Substantial effort is made to insulate Outside Directors from influence 
by shareholders. Outside Directors can only be removed from their office 
with the approval of the DSS, and in conjunction with the selection of a 
DSS-approved successor. 131  In practice, Outside Directors are never 
removed from office. DSS is always suspicious that removal requests are an 
effort to bully a competent and loyal director who merely opposes 
inappropriate foreign influence. One former senior DSS official stated that 
a company seeking to remove a director would need to submit a written 
argument supporting the removal, preferably identifying problems that 
would impair both corporate performance and performance of national 
security goals, “like literally never showing up to a board meeting.” It is 
then “likely” that DSS would accept the removal from the company. That 
former official was not aware of any director removal during their five-year 
tenure. 
																																																								
126.  FOCI FAQs, DEF. SECURITY SERV., https://perma.cc/8WFX-4AFA (last visited Oct. 5, 
2017). 
127.  NISPOM, supra note 36, § 2-305(c); 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(6)(iv) (2017). The NISPOM 
defines personnel security clearance as an “administrative determination that an individual is eligible, 
from a security point of view, for access to classified information of the same or lower category as the 
level of the personnel clearance being granted.” NISPOM, supra note 36, app. C, at C-4. Although 
newcomers are permitted to obtain security clearance in connection with their ascension to a board seat, 
it is far quicker and cheaper to select a candidate who already has (or recently had) security clearance. 
One contact assured me that cleared candidates can expect a $5,000–500,000 bump in their salary, in 
recognition of the convenience their clearance affords their employer. 
128.  DEF. SEC. SERV., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Sample Letter to Approved Outside Director Nominee, 
(2006) (requiring no prior relationship with the corporation or its affiliates), 
http://www.dss.mil/documents/foci/OutsideDirectSample.pdf. Current and former employees are 
thought to be too concerned with the company’s success to represent the government’s interests properly. 
This means that if the company wishes to find candidates within its professional network, it must look a 
few nodes past the obvious candidates. 
129.  One Inside Director and industry expert recommended hiring one private-sector defense 
contractor with facility security experience in addition to any other types of directors on July 14, 2015. 
130.  Why this should be effective is the subject of later discussion.  
131.  SAMPLE SCA, supra note 114, § 1.2.2(a). There is an exception for illegality or “actual or 
possible damage to the Corporation,” in which case emergency removal is possible. Id. § 1.2.2(b). 
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Three hundred ninety-three companies now provide for Outside 
Directors, most of which have a majority of Outside Directors. 132  The 
number of Outside Directors at each company depends on the degree of 
foreign investment or influence. Sometimes just one Outside Director will 
suffice, while at other times, Outside Directors will populate nearly the 
entire board.133 
2. Inside Directors 
If a foreign investor owns sufficient equity to select one or more 
directors, then a second character may arrive on the scene: the “inside” 
director. The inside director is specifically responsible for looking after the 
interests of the foreign investor. That charge comes with numerous 
restrictions.134 They may not influence the performance of any contracts 
containing classified information, nor may they access or learn about any 
classified information. This is true even if the information is crucial to 
understanding the business risks of the company.  
None of these prohibitions turn on the trustworthiness of the inside 
director themselves. A foreign investor may not, for example, nominate a 
trusted statesman with active security clearance, even though such a person 
could not lawfully share secrets with the investor anyway. The investor must 
select an individual without security clearance, who is therefore denied 
access to core company information. Among directors with different 
mandates – Outside Directors representing the government, inside directors 
representing the shareholders – only the former operate with full 
information. The foreign investor therefore is largely marginalized even 
																																																								
132.  FOIA Response, supra note 8 (totaling Proxy Agreements, Special Security Agreements, 
and Security Control Agreements). The number of firms subject to SSA mitigation may understate the 
number of transactions covered: “[F]requent acquirers negotiate ‘umbrella’ SSAs, under which trusted 
foreign defense contractors can place future acquisitions without needing to negotiate a new agreement.” 
DAVID MARCHICK & EDWARD M. GRAHAM, US NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 73 (2006). 
133.  32 C.F.R. § 117.56(b)(6)(B)(iii) (2017) (at a minimum, the number of Outside Directors 
must exceed inside directors). When a foreign investor “effectively owns or controls a company” more 
mitigation, more Outside Directors, and substantially more non-governance mitigation will likely be 
required. 32 C.F.R. § 117.56(B)(4)(iii)(C)–(D) (2017) (providing for special security, Voting Trust, or 
Proxy Agreements under these circumstances).  
134.  For example, inside directors may not serve as chairmen of the board. SAMPLE SSA, supra 
note 115, § 1.01. 
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when represented on the board. 135 At present, 317 companies have one or 
more inside directors.136  
3. Proxy Holders 
Where a foreign investor “effectively owns or controls a company” and 
the contractor is working on sensitive projects, effective national security 
corporate governance requires more than simply tinkering with the ratio of 
inside and Outside Directors. 137  In those cases, “the foreign owner 
relinquishes most rights associated with ownership of the company to 
cleared U.S. citizens approved by DSS.” The investor cedes almost all of 
her rights as an investor to a slate of “proxy holders.”  
These proxy holders vote in the shareholders’ place in nearly every 
matter. 138 They elect a slate of directors, which will necessarily include 
themselves and a few other managers.139 The majority shareholder elects 
none of the directors, except insofar as the shareholder proposed the initial 
proxy holders.140 
With proxy holders electing the board and filling any replacements, and 
with proxy members largely populating the board, the directors are no 
longer accountable to the investors. The proxy holders are “not to accept 
direction from the Shareholder on any matter . . . and not to permit the 
Shareholder to exercise any control or influence over the business or 																																																								
135.  In one case, a foreign investor escaped liability for the torts of the contractor, despite being 
the sole owner of the contractor and despite two members of the parent company’s board serving as 
inside directors on the contactor’s board. Why? The court cited the mitigation agreement as proof that 
the parent simply did not have enough influence to be responsible for the subsidiary’s activities. 
Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013). 
136.  FOIA Response, supra note 8. 
137.  Firms subject to a Security Control Agreement may not access “proscribed information,” 
limiting the project on which they can work. 32 C.F.R. § 2004.5(e) (2017). Special Security Agreements 
permit a company to service classified contracts, but only after obtaining an additional approval: a 
“national interest determination” or NID. 32 C.F.R. § 2004.22(c)(3) (2017). Although the process for 
obtaining a NID has recently been greatly eased, companies continue to perceive NIDs to be a major 
barrier to success. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DTM 15-002, POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE PROCESSING OF 
NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATIONS (NIDS) IN CONNECTION WITH FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, 
OR INFLUENCE (FOCI) 5 (2015) (giving DSS a lead role in coordinating other agencies); 32 C.F.R. § 
2004.22(c)(3) (2017) (permitting diverse range of NID options). See also Chris Griner et. al., How DOD 
is Streamlining National Interest Determinations, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:39 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/624507/how-dod-is-streamlining-national-interest-determinations. 
Many companies opt for more mitigation than is strictly required as an attractive alternative to pursuing 
a series of NIDs. 
138.  SAMPLE PROXY AGREEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 7.01, 13.01. However, the shareholders’ 
approval is required for some of the most momentous corporate decisions such as mergers, dissolution, 
and bankruptcy. Id. § 7.03. 
139.  Id. § 3.01. 
140.  Id. § 6.05. 
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management of the Corporation . . . .”141 Even the unclassified portions of 
classified contracts must be free from any shareholder influence. 142 Like the 
Outside Directors, proxy holders’ state law fiduciary duties are purportedly 
preempted.143 The goal of a “proxy agreement”144 is to “effectively exclude 
the Shareholder . . . from . . . influence over the Corporation’s business or 
management[.]”145  
To that end, many other prophylactic measures are contemplated. The 
proxy holders’ salaries, while initially negotiated with the shareholder, are 
not to vary during their tenure.146 The shareholders are not allowed to attend 
any meetings of the proxy holders or board unless a written agenda is 
submitted to DSS in advance. 147  Likewise, any visits between the 
shareholders and their company or its representatives must be approved in 
advance by the proxy holders,148 and substantial visits must be approved by 
DSS. 149 Even “strictly social contacts” require written reports,150 though the 
proxy holders may consult with the foreign owner, or vice versa, where 
“consistent with applicable United States laws.”151  
Proxy holders enjoy even stronger tenure than Outside Directors.152 The 
shareholder cannot fire a proxy holder “except for acts of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct,” and even then, the shareholder must give DSS 
twenty days’ notice and secure DSS’s approval for a replacement proxy 
holder.153 Furthermore, there must always be at least two proxy holders, and 
no removal is effective if it would temporarily reduce the number to just one 
proxy holder.154 It is, therefore, impossible for the shareholder to make 
sweeping changes to ineffective overseers.  																																																								
141.  Id. § 3.05(g). 
142.  FOCI Industry Working Group Meeting, Meeting Questions with Answers from the Defense 
Security Service (Aug. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/BG6U-33GB . 
143.  SAMPLE PROXY AGREEMENT, supra note 2, § 2.05(a)  
144.  A second insulating option is the Voting Trust Agreement, in which the investors’ shares are 
put into a trust, which the trustees then vote and manage in a manner much like the Proxy Agreements 
described here. Once common, Voting Trust Agreements are now essentially unknown. They were 
motivated in part by tax considerations that are no longer relevant.  
145.  Id. at 4. 
146.  Id. § 3.02.  
147.  Id. § 11.01(a).  
148.  Id. § 11.01(b). Slightly less onerous visit restrictions also apply to a Special Security 
Agreement company. Comparison: Special Security Agreement & Proxy Agreement, DEF. SECURITY 
SERV., https://perma.cc/4JKG-BU9X (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
149.  Generally, visits that exceed thirty consecutive business days or cumulatively exceed two 
hundred days in a single year require advance DSS approval. See DEF. SEC. SERV., supra note 113, at 5. 
150.  SAMPLE PROXY AGREEMENT, supra note 2, § 11.01(b).  
151.  Id. § 8.06. 
152.  For example, proxy holders are indemnified against liability. Id. art. IV. 
153.  Id. § 2.02. The proxy holder can also be eliminated with the approval of Department of 
Defense for a violation of the Proxy Agreement. Id. § 2.03. 
154.  Id. § 2.02. 
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As a general matter, when a proxy holder is evicted, or decides to retire, 
the remaining proxy holders get to select her replacement.155 Proxy holders 
are initially nominated by the shareholder, but they soon become a self-
perpetuating and self-directing body. 
At present, seventy-six companies operate with proxy holders, or nearly 
a quarter of the relevant companies. 156 
C. Summarizing National Security Corporate Governance 
The combination of inside directors, Outside Directors, and proxy 
holders profoundly restructures corporate governance. Among the almost 
400 contractors subject to national security governance, government 
representatives dominate the board about 90 percent of the time. And in 
almost a quarter of those cases, the shareholder elects none of the board 
members. Figure I summarizes those results. 
 157
 
At some FOCI companies, the foreign investor has no meaningful 
influence over the board, the directors are vested with durable and self-																																																								
155.  Id. § 2.05(a). The shareholder can veto nominated replacements, id. § 2.05(b), but only three 
times. Id. § 2.05(c).  
156.  FOIA Response, supra note 8. 
157.  This chart counts the number of FOCI agreements, thereby counting parent or operating 
companies. This is the figure DSS uses. See Hamre, supra note 51 (Director Sims counting parent 
companies). It is a more conservative number, since a large company could have several subsidiaries 
subject to FOCI mitigation.  
Minority  
13%
Controlling
68%
Total
19%
Figure I: Government's 
Representation on Board
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perpetuating offices, and fiduciary duties are “preempted.”158 At others, the 
board is divided into two or three classes (ordinary, inside and outside), each 
serving different constituencies and possessing different qualifications, 
protections, and degrees of knowledge.159  
The former companies may be referred to as “insulated” companies, 
because as the leadership is insulated from investor influence, and the latter 
may be called “factionalized” companies, because the board is riven into 
factions with radically different allegiances and powers. In either case, the 
government gains board-level influence and information pertinent to the 
private company’s contribution to national security. Nineteen percent of 
companies are insulated, while the remaining 81 percent are factionalized.  
 
Particularly with respect to the insulated companies, national security 
corporate governance represents a striking departure from corporate law’s 
empowerment of shareholders, particularly with respect to majority- and 
wholly-owned corporations. While some might argue that publicly held 
companies never have real accountability for directors to shareholders, 
firms with substantial blockholding can ordinarily count on meaningful 
managerial accountability to the shareholders. Mitigating firms are, by 
definition, ones in which shareholding is concentrated enough to influence 
management. Entrenched management is therefore unusual in such firms. 
																																																								
158.  Supra notes 137–56 and accompanying text. 
159.  See supra notes 122–56 and accompanying text.  
Insulated
19%
Factionalized
81%
Figure II: Governance 
Mitigation Type
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Moreover, even in publicly held firms, where accountability is 
sometimes tenuous, the market for corporate control looms as a source of 
discipline.160 If directors are incompetent or disloyal, they face the threat of 
takeover by an acquiring investor. However, national security governed 
firms are often privately held, making the threat of takeover quite low. 
Moreover, as is discussed infra, even publicly traded firms may be sheltered 
from the market for corporate control by way of national security corporate 
governance.  
All that is to say that these are meaningful departures from familiar 
governance patterns. The implications of that – in terms of benefits and 
costs – requires careful analysis. The following part ventures such analysis 
by discussing national security corporate governance’s likely impact on 
managerial accountability and efficiency, security and safety, and 
accountability and government integrity. 
III. NATIONAL SECURITY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’S COSTS & 
BENEFITS 
Imposing national security protections inside the governance apparatus 
disrupts the ordering that American corporate law ordinarily prefigures. If 
this results in higher ex post agency costs for the contractor, they may tend 
to charge more ex ante, returning the cost of government regulation back to 
the government itself.161 Such costs may be worthwhile if compliance and 
security are ensured. However, the results are far from perfect. Subject firms 
sometimes deliver commendable inspection results,162 but failures are also 
evident. 163  Regardless of whether security is achieved at a fair price, 
national security corporate governance also creates opportunities for 
collusive bargains between industry and government officials. Such rent-
seeking is both understandable and undesirable.  
This Part analyzes the costs and benefits of national security corporate 
governance in terms of efficiency, security, and rent-seeking. It contains a 
mixture of economic analysis and empirical evidence drawn from 
interviews, among other sources. 																																																								
160.  See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965).  
161.  See infra notes 260–62 and accompanying text. 
162.  DEF. SEC. SERV., 2014 DSS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT RATING MATRIX: 
VULNERABILITIES AND NISP ENHANCEMENT CATEGORIES 2 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/201 
50915112823/http:/www.dss.mil/documents/facility-
clearances/Vuln_Assm_Rating_Matrix_2014_Update.pdf (finding that 17 percent of U.S. defense 
industry facilities were “commendable” in their compliance with federal guidelines for the 2012 fiscal 
year). 
163.  It is small solace that if compliance is weak, agency costs may not be as high as once thought. 
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A. Corporate Governance  
Good corporate governance is arguably the principal focus of, and 
justification for, corporate law. Since Berle and Means decried the 
managerial firm’s bloated inefficiencies, scholars have emphasized 
accountability to shareholders as a cornerstone of good governance.164 As 
realized, corporate law has generally favored a collegial and unified board. 
Directors may bring different skills to the table, but they are all supposed to 
serve all shareholders equally, and with equal access to information. These 
aspects of the typical corporation are thought to conduce to efficient 
enterprises, and so be of public concern.  
National security corporate governance modifies these governance 
arrangements, and so raises the specter of inefficiency. This section looks 
at national security corporate governance’s impact on board accountability, 
objectives, and unity. It does so by recounting some of the principal features 
of orthodox corporate governance wisdom.165  
1. Accountability 
Orthodox corporate governance emphasizes managerial accountability 
to the owners of the firm. Directors do not serve as “platonic masters,” and 
courts are hostile to entrenchment efforts.166 The fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
not easily waived.167 Courts defend the shareholder franchise in strident 
																																																								
164.  See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).  
165.  Although acquainting readers with these features requires a discussion of their purported 
utility, it is beyond the scope of this Article to actually consider and defend any single element of 
corporate orthodoxy. Instead, this Article will note where national security corporate governance departs 
from orthodoxy and takes for granted that this is presumptively problematic, without exhaustively 
considering whether alternative governance structures may sometimes be defensible on efficiency 
grounds. Cf. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 
(2013) (questioning the descriptive and normative presumption in favor of this “orthodox” corporate 
governance). Corporate defaults can be modified in numerous ways in America and its rules differ 
greatly among jurisdictions, so it is no surprise that methods of governance differ. Still, the form of 
governance created in national security corporate governance is quite a departure.  
166.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988). However, incumbent 
directors may spend company money to campaign in elections, demand for-cause termination 
provisions, and adopt proportional takeover defense. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (“[T]he power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer ultimately lies with the board of 
directors.”). 
167.  Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (2011); 
Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 859 (2008).  
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terms.168 At a minimum, the shareholders of the firms should have recourse 
to the ballot box in order to eject obviously incompetent or disloyal 
directors 169  and to the courthouse to sue the worst offenders for 
wrongdoing.170  
Without such accountability mechanisms, the managers may 
inefficiently slacken their efforts or enrich themselves (or their pet causes) 
at the expense of the owners.171 Ultimately, firms marshal society’s wealth 
toward projects, and the legitimacy and utility of that arrangement depends 
on competent managers pursuing productive ends. Empowered 
shareholders press managers to serve customers, economize scarce 
resources, or otherwise improve the fit between the corporation’s means and 
ends.172  
National security corporate governance represents a strong departure for 
many companies from what would otherwise be the optimal form and level 
of accountability, from director selection to removal and everything in 
between.  
Directors and proxy holders can only be removed with DSS’s consent, 
which DSS gives very reluctantly, if ever.173 Even if DSS ultimately agrees 
with the company, the time and difficulty of removal should dampen 
managerial incentives at the margin.  
Interviews with industry participants confirm worries about 
accountability in terms of selection and retention. Interview subjects agreed 
that proxy holders or Outside Directors often retain their jobs despite poor 																																																								
168.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
169.  Directors can always be removed for cause, and often without any cause. See, e.g., Campbell 
v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 858 (Del. Ch. 1957).  
170.  See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366–67 (Del. 2006). Note that 
often these suits are derivative in nature. The duty of loyalty is difficult to waive, at least within the 
corporate form. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017) (barring charter provisions that limit or 
eliminate the fiduciary duty of loyalty); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 
34, 51 (Del. 1994) (noting that a corporation may not contractually limit a corporate fiduciary’s Revlon 
duties). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2017) (authorizing waiver of duty of loyalty for 
LLCs).  
171.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 164. If shareholders know about these problems, they will 
adjust their willingness to hand over their money. They will impound waste and inefficiency into the 
price they are willing to pay for shares. No one gets less than they paid for, but each will have been 
happy to pay more for a better-managed company. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory 
of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980). 
172.  The proper balance between accountability and discretion remains subject to debate. Supra 
note 11. Managers maintain control over most corporate decisions. Cremers & Sepe, supra note 11, at 
69 (“American shareholders have . . . only a limited capacity to intervene in corporate affairs.”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010). The proper 
balance surely varies by company. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for 
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017). 
173.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
808 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:775 
 
 
 
	
performance. One former flag officer did not know how to use a laptop 
computer. Another had developed an idiosyncratic jargon so opaque that 
only his long-time personal assistant could translate for him.  
National security corporate governance leads to the selection of many 
former “flag officers,” such as retired admirals and generals. While many 
flag officers have managed large organizations, few have experience in a 
business setting. These respected military and intelligence veterans may 
have seemed like good choices ex ante because companies must secure 
DSS’s approval for any candidate. But years later, the company is stuck 
with a less than ideal choice. One interview subject stated that companies 
must think of proxy holders’ nominations as “lifetime appointments.” 
Companies’ public securities filings sometimes highlight the difficulty of 
removing a director.174  
To quantify the costs of a lack of accountability, one can only speculate 
on the basis of public sources. The 1986 bankruptcy of LTV Corporation 
was, at the time, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.175 Thousands of 
employees and countless retirees relied on its $6 billion capitalization for 
their livelihood, so it is understandable that the bankruptcy judge would 
want to maximize the chances of survival for the company by ensuring the 
highest possible value for any divisions to be divested in the bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
LTV Aerospace and Defense Company’s missiles division was one such 
division. There must have been great relief in April of 1992 when LTV 
confirmed that it had found a buyer for the missiles division willing to pay 
the princely sum of $450 million – nearly 20 percent more than the next best 
bid.176 The only problem was that the buyer, Thomson-CSF, was majority 
owned by the government of France. 
After the asset purchase agreement was signed, Thomson met repeatedly 
with DSS to discuss appropriate national security corporate governance. 
Designing missiles required LTV to access communications security 
(COMSEC) information and other categories of sensitive information,177 
and Thomson knew that national security corporate governance would be 
required in order to maintain the subsidiary’s clearance and contracts. 
However, Thomson expected, given the severability of the proscribed data 																																																								
174.  Allison Transmission Holdings, Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1) (Mar. 12, 2012) (disclosing barriers to removing an Outside Director).  
175.  Thomas C. Hayes, LTV Corp. Files for Bankruptcy; Debt is $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
1986, at D4. 
176.  Better still, the buyer’s bid came paired with a very attractive offer from an allied firm 
willing to buy the aircraft division. In re Chateaugay Corp., 186 B.R. 561, 573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
order aff'd, 198 B.R. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1369 (2d Cir. 1997). 
177.  Id. at 569. 
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from the rest of the project, and given the close ties between France and 
America—NATO allies—that a special security agreement (SSA) would 
suffice. That is, Thomson expected and was willing to accept a 
factionalizing governance mitigation in which it would elect only a few 
inside directors despite owning all the shares. However, DSS pushed for the 
use of a proxy agreement to completely insulate the company from French 
influence, allowing Thomson zero directors. 
Thomson thought that game was not worth the candle. It wished to have 
some say in the compensation and retention of the missiles division’s CEO, 
and it wanted the right to approve budgets, and mergers and acquisitions.178  
Thomson backed out of the deal, and LTV had to scramble for other 
suitors. The next highest offer came from Marietta & Lockheed, which 
jointly offered only $385 million, despite the bankruptcy judge’s repeated 
urging that they raise the bid.179 National security corporate governance 
drove at least a $65 million wedge—about 15 percent of the division’s entire 
value—between what the most interested buyer would have paid and what 
the estate actually received.180 
While the scale and timing of Thomson’s disappointment may be 
unusual, it is not unusual for parties to agree that national security corporate 
governance is a key deal term. Merger and acquisition agreements 
frequently discuss FOCI mitigation, committing the parties to seek one sort 
of national security corporate governance and scuttling the deal if DSS 
demands more. 181  Cancelled deals represent lower returns to selling 
shareholders and lost chances for the customer to enjoy efficient production. 
																																																								
178.  Id. at 573. Note that even the most severe national security corporate governance ordinarily 
affords the shareholder veto power over mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Perhaps Thomson wished to 
have the right to initiate M&A for its subsidiary, or perhaps it was not satisfied with the degree of veto 
power then available.  
179.  Matthew D. Riven, The Attempted Takeover of LTV by Thomson: Should the United States 
Regulate Inward Investment by Foreign State-Owned Enterprises?, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 759, 761 
(1993). 
180.  The difference is even starker if a reverse-breakup fee is considered. Thomson had promised 
$20 million to LTV in the event that Thomson failed to close on the deal (plus any legal fees and minus 
whatever chance those legal fees helped Thomson to avoid the breakup fee). Thomson should have been 
willing to pay $20 million more than others even if national security corporate governance destroyed all 
synergies of the merger. That means the wedge was closer to $85 million, or 22 percent of the total deal 
value, and the cost difference between a factionalizing mitigation and an insulating mitigation must have 
appeared to exceed 6 percent of the deal value. 
Of course, this high difference in price can also be a sign that Thomson had illicit motives in the 
purchase. If it planned to share U.S. military secrets with France or others, it might have been willing to 
pay more than others on that basis.  
181.  See, e.g., Glob. Def. & Nat’l Sec. Holdings, LLC, Stock Purchase Agreement § 6.7(d) 
(2015), https://perma.cc/5KJE-GKD9. 
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Countless other bids are surely never made because the bidder knows what 
problems they will face.182  
Parties’ decisions to abandon acquisitions if confronted with 
burdensome national security corporate governance is both a social cost, 
and a cause of other costs. Like any barrier to the market for corporate 
control, national security corporate governance gives extra slack to 
managers.183 There are indications that companies sometimes hoist the flag 
of endangered security clearance defensively, in order to frustrate hostile 
acquisitions. For example, one of the world’s largest ink and dye producers 
attempted to keep a Japanese purchaser at bay by citing concern for 
mounting FOCI mitigation burdens. 184  Another fiduciary duty lawsuit 
recently alleged that management had preferred a white-knight foreign 
purchaser because they liked the idea of an absentee owner, who could not 
take an active role in management and who could not readily fire the 
existing managers.185 
																																																								
182.  Cf. Robert T. Miller, Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest 
Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners, 39 J. CORP. L. 71, 123 (2013); Paul 
Connell & Tian Huang, Note, An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment 
Regulation in the United States, 39 YALE J. INT'L L. 131 (2014). W. Robert Shearer, Comment, The 
Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1735 
(1993) (“While Exon-Florio ostensibly serves the legitimate purpose of helping to protect U.S. national 
security, its vague parameters and elastic provisions create a potent protectionist weapon that virtually 
invites abuse.”); Christopher S. Kulander, Intruder Alert! Running the Regulatory Gauntlet To Purchase, 
Own, and Operate American Energy and Mineral Assets by Foreign Entities, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 995 
(2014); Jim Mendenhall, United States: Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions Under the Exon-
Florio Amendment—The Mamco Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 227, 286, 290–93 (1991); Margaret 
L. Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for Understanding the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2011); Jose E. Alvarez, Political 
Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-
Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 149-50 (1989). 
183.  On the better known defensive uses of CFIUS, see generally ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & 
ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS § 11.04 (7th ed. 2015). 
See also Merrill, supra note 182, at 37. 
184.  Sun Chem. Corp. v. Dainippon Ink & Chems., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (“Sun contends that any increase in Dainippon's stock ownership above the 4.9% it now holds 
would cause the loss of Kollsman's classified military instrumentation business . . . .”); see also Amy 
Butler Washington et al., Balancing Act, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 1, 2012, at 32 (“BAE 
Systems executives believe any threat from the merger to its Special Security Agreement (SSA) with 
the U.S. government would be a "deal breaker," says an industry official close to the talks. Each SSA is 
tailored to the specific business of a particular company.”). 
185.  Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 36 A.3d 1082, 1090 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). The court 
rejected plaintiff’s argument, concluding that NISPOM actually requires Outside Directors have no prior 
involvement with the company, and so the foreign purchaser would be bad for the incumbents. See id. 
at 1091 n.10. It is true that the current board could probably not retain its job, but the current executives 
could probably serve as managers still, and could avoid serious scrutiny, since all governance would 
break down in the company. Insofar as board members were also executives, they would indeed have 
self-serving reasons to seek an appropriate foreign buyer.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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2. Shareholder-Centrism 
It is generally agreed that shareholders are the appropriate object of 
managerial concern, and that they are properly regarded as the sole 
“owners” to whom directors owe duties and are electorally accountable.186 
There are good economic reasons for this perspective. Shareholders are risk 
bearers and residual claimants; 187  it is particularly hard for them to 
completely protect themselves by clear contract terms alone since literally 
every business choice affects them.188 Furthermore, their capital is locked 
in forever.189 That means that they cannot protect themselves by breaking 
off business ties if exploited as can, say, employees. 190  Finally, equity 
investors are also a relatively homogeneous group, mostly united in their 
goal of absolute financial return, which lowers their relative “cost of 
ownership.” 191 
In factionalized firms, control is shared between the shareholders and the 
customer, because the mitigation agreement grants board seats both to the 																																																								
186.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 10 (Ctr. for 
Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 280, 2000), http://www.law.harvard.e 
du/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/280.pdf (“as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is 
convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end—the pursuit of aggregate social welfare— 
is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests”); Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). But see Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The Theory and 
Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public Companies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER 
POWER 459 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (problematizing ownership). 
187.  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991). They also happen to be good risk bearers because they can diversify their 
risks. It is easier to own shares in 1,000 companies than to shop at 1,000 co-op grocery stores or to work 
at 1,000 labor-owned factories. 
188.  E.g., Williamson, supra note 12 (arguing against directorial representation for other 
constituencies). Although no one can predict the future, shareholders face the hardest challenges in 
telling managers up front how they would want the company run; they need to have some power to 
continue to direct the managers toward good projects in a changing world. But see Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Sepe, supra 
note 12; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 440 (1986). 
Each of these authors argues that other parties face incomplete contracts and residual claims, 
undermining the notion of “ownership.” Edelman and Thomas attempt to strike a balance between the 
orthodox position and these critics by arguing that only equity investors care about share price, and that 
share price is influenced by all factors. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 186. 
189.  Capital lock-in is one of the great contributions of modern corporate law. See generally 
Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976) 
(discussing the liability of shareholders compared to creditors). 
190.  See e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, 
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990) (arguing that control rights 
are located at the point most subject to inefficient hold up). 
191.  HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). Other patrons of the firm, 
such as employees and customers, have conflicting goals and may waste resources fighting to secure 
their goals. 
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investor and to government representatives. When either the shareholder or 
the government expends efforts to lobby the board to take a certain decision, 
those lobbying efforts are potentially wasteful.  
While the cost of politics drops when firms become fully insulated, other 
costs grow. Proxy holders representing the government-customer now 
control a firm that they do not own, and they may opt to expropriate assets 
from the investor or impose inefficient behaviors that it would never have 
been willing to buy through a clear ex ante deal. For example, government 
representatives might cause the company to marginally increase the quality 
of a product or the security surrounding the production at a riotously large 
cost, since the government enjoys the benefit without directly paying the 
cost. Or the board might cause the company to break off profitable business 
with another nation in order to trivially improve security for the 
government. The shareholders, in contrast, will be understandably reluctant 
to accept residual claims if they have little influence over their sign and 
magnitude, and they may account for all of this ex ante in the price that they 
quote the government.  
3. Unity 
Governance orthodoxy and corporate law have generally favored a 
version of directorial unity: the board as a whole should be accountable to 
the shareholders as a whole,192 rather than some narrower constituency. 193 																																																								
192.  Directorial role can be likened to representative role. See Andrew Verstein, Trustee or 
Delegate? Understanding Representation To Illuminate Shareholder Governance and Regulatory 
Change, 9 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 74 (2012). The constituency director model is akin to a Madisonian 
delegate and the unity model is akin to the Burkean trustee. 
193.  David M. Morris et al., Designated Directors and Designating Investors: Early Planning is 
Key, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May/June 2008, at 5 (“Under New York and Delaware law, 
designated directors (also known as ‘representative’ or ‘constituency’ directors) have the same fiduciary 
duties as other directors to the corporations on whose board they serve.”). See also Williamson v. Cox 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1663-N, 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 n.49 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (“As 
directors . . . the individual defendants owed fiduciary duties to the Company.”); 1 R. FRANKLIN 
BALOTTI & JOSEPH A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS, § 4.16 [E][2] (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2008) (“[T]he duties of directors designated by 
large stockholders are clear: under Weinberger, they still owe the corporation and its shareholders an 
uncompromising duty of loyalty.”); 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW, § 141.2.1.7 (5th ed. 2006) (“[T]he law does not recognize a special duty on the part 
of directors elected by a special class to the class electing them. Rather, the law demands directors' 
fidelity toward the corporation and all its shareholders.”); cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 
1984) (“[I]t is not enough to charge that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of those 
controlling the outcome of a corporate election. That is the usual way a person becomes a corporate 
director.”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig.,Civil Action No. 1512-CC, 
2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
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Divisions among directors can raise the cost of consensus in what is 
intended to be a collegial and collaborative decision, since some directors 
may be affiliation-bound to support only certain lines of inquiry.  
One place unity makes a difference is in terms of information flows. If 
some directors smuggle secrets to their patrons while concealing from the 
board some salient information gleaned from those same patrons, other 
directors may be disinclined to speak freely in the no longer honest and 
candid boardroom.194 Thus the law typically recognizes that each “director 
has independent fiduciary duties to the corporation and all of its 
shareholders, which duties are usually understood to include a duty to 
maintain the confidences of the corporation.”195 A director cannot disclose 
corporate information to just the shareholder patron who nominated her, nor 
are they to deprive the company of salient information derived from that 
patron. 196 The board may divide into committees, and individual board 
members may opt to leave the room when conflicted as to a particular 
transaction, but directors themselves are not arranged into classes, some of 
whom are systematically uninformed.197  
Factional mitigation agreements explicitly define classes of constituency 
directors – those who represent the shareholder, and those who represent the 																																																								
Some have discussed unity as unrealistic. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley 
Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 789 (2013). See also Janet E. Kerr, The Financial 
Meltdown of 2008 and the Government's Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of 
American Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors, 
85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 49, 92 (2011) (“‘[C]onstituency directors’ or ‘representative directors’ . . . may 
feel a responsibility to serve the constituency that helped them obtain their position.”); cf. Steven N. 
Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis 
of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287-90 (2003) (investigating a sample of 119 
startups, finding venture capitalist investors get a seat on the board of directors in almost half of startups 
and board control in about 25 percent).  
Others have attacked unity as inefficient. E.g., Sepe, supra note 12, at 312; see also Martin Gelter 
& Genevieve Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069 (2015). 
194.  See Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. 
REV. 1246 (2017) (discussing tensions related to information sharing). 
195.  See ABA COMMITTEE ON CORP. LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 26-27 (5th 
ed. 2007).  
196.  Morris et al., supra note 193 (“In connection with an issue before the board directors have a 
duty to bring all of their knowledge and skill to bear. This includes a duty to disclose all material 
information known to the director relevant to the issue before the board.”); ABA COMMITTEE ON CORP. 
LAWS, supra note 195, at 21.  
197.  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §3.03(a) (2017) (“Every director has the right . . . to inspect and copy all books, 
records, and documents of every kind, and to inspect the physical properties, of the corporation and of 
its subsidiaries, domestic or foreign, at any reasonable time, in person or by any attorney or other 
agent.”); Kalisman v. Friedman, C.A. No. 8447-VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013) 
(directors’ access to corporate information “essentially unfettered in nature”); Kortum v. Webasto 
Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 118 (Del. Ch. 2000) (director’s request for information presumed valid). 
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government. These divisions are supplemented by differences in the powers 
and information held by the different classes. Inside directors are not 
permitted access to any sensitive information. This is so even if the 
shareholder is willing to nominate trusted former statesmen already cleared 
to handle the nation’s secrets. As a result, national security corporate 
governance ensures information blockages and asymmetries within the 
board.  
There are also differences in information outflows. The GSC, composed 
of the Outside Directors and cleared officers, meets at least annually with 
DSS to provide extensive disclosure about the company’s compliance and 
any plans that could influence compliance. This may increase the risk of 
company secrets being leaked to competitors, or might make boardroom 
conversations less candid. Most mitigation agreements substantially curtail 
directorial unity, plausibly leading to inefficiency.  
Theory and anecdote suggest that national security corporate governance 
frustrates efficient governance systems. Someone bears the cost, and it may 
be the government.198 Is there a systematic way that the government can 
determine whether the national security benefits of national security 
corporate governance are worth the cost? The answer will depend in part on 
how much these agreements improve security, the subject of the next 
section. 
B. National Security 
How well does national security corporate governance do in improving 
security? The answer is far from certain. There are some good signs in terms 
of security compliance at affected firms, but there are also ample examples 
of security lapses. It is impossible to conclude that national security 
corporate governance is useless, but it is equally impossible to decide that 
the government is getting its money’s worth from the program.  
On the positive side, DSS reports that complying companies have similar 
inspection results as compared to other government contractors, even 
though they presumably face greater risks.199 However, it is unclear how 
much of this success results from FOCI’s governance mitigations, and how 
much results from operational changes or other forms of oversight. Most 
FOCI firms are observed much more closely than similarly situated 																																																								
198.  Infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
199.  Compare DEF. SEC. SERV., supra note 162 (finding 17 percent of U.S. defense industry 
facilities were “commendable” in their compliance with federal guidelines for fiscal year 2012), with 
FOIA Response, supra note 8, at encl. 2 (reporting 19.05 percent “commendable” for FOCI companies 
in fiscal year 2014).  
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domestic firms and have numerous meetings with Government Security 
Committees and annual inspections. It is possible that close government 
scrutiny of covered firms, and not governance modification, is doing the 
work. A selection bias may also be at work: national security corporate 
governance may be cheapest to firms that – for whatever other reason – 
already have robust security commitments. We would expect those firms to 
have performed well even if national security corporate governance were a 
placebo.  
And compliance is often less than perfect. 200  One lesson from the 
corporate governance literature is that formal insulation from shareholder 
control may not be sufficient to actually constrain shareholder control.201 In 
many cases, the gravitational pull toward shareholder interests is inexorable, 
and directors may find themselves in their investors’ sway – no matter how 
strongly admonished to disregard such influence, and no matter how many 
barriers are put into place.202 If some shareholders use this influence to 
extract secrets, then the results will be worrisome.  
Outside Directors may be difficult to remove, but the foreign investor 
gets to nominate the initial batch of directors or proxy holders, and they are 
presumably adept at vetting candidates for their responsiveness to the 
investors’ objectives. Nor can a director costlessly abandon her patron once 
actually installed on the board. Many directors would happily serve on 
several boards, collecting several sets of fees as welcome retirement 
income. In the incestuous world of intelligence work, directors could 
quickly develop a reputation for being uncooperative and miss out on 
nominations to lucrative future gigs.  
Sometimes, investors may tighten the reins over directors by 
implementing compensation policies that are actually at odds with national 
security corporate governance procedures. For example, a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report—pointedly titled “DOD Cannot 
Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient” 
—found one proxy holder running a consulting company that does 
																																																								
200.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL 
SECURITY (2011) (finding that 1.7 percent of its FOCI companies deserved a “marginal” or 
“unsatisfactory” security ranking, compared to 0.7 percent of non-FOCI companies).  
201.  E.W. Thomas, The Role of Nominee Directors and the Liability of Their Appointors, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 148, 150 (Ian Ramsay ed., 1997) 
(describing “[l]oyalty inspired by selection, and confirmed by the confidence which the appointors 
repose in their nominees”). 
202.  See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 46, at 1365–66 (describing techniques by which foreign 
investors can influence a company, even once stripped of voting rights).  
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substantial business with the foreign investor.203 Another company hired 
one proxy holder as its CEO, paying him an executive salary almost six 
times as large as his stipend as a proxy holder. Although in violation of the 
proxy agreement, DSS did not immediately notice the conflict. The GAO 
noted that even “[a]fter DSS became aware of this relationship . . . the 
individual has remained as a proxy holder.”204  
 One key mechanism implemented to ensure Outside Directors’ 
devotion to national security, the military and government pedigree, can 
sometimes serve to endanger national security. The cultures of military and 
intelligence work may incline current and former government officials to 
place outsized trust in former government officials. The parent company 
will often also employ a bevy of respected flag officers. Thus, even if the 
directors of the contractor subsidiary are formally independent of the parent, 
their social and learned orientations may lead them to excessively defer to 
the influence of the parent. Likewise, DSS officials may themselves be 
drawn to trust former DSS and DOD agents now ensconced as directors of 
FOCI firms.  
Similarly, Outside Directors, those chosen in connection with DSS, are 
all outsiders to the company. None are past or present employees or 
investors in the firm. Of course, this professional independence is intended 
to instill independence of judgment. But research on “independent 
directors” in traditional public companies has given mixed results even in 
ordinary companies with no connection to national security corporate 
governance. 205  Lacking firsthand knowledge of the company, Outside 
Directors may be slow to discover latent security risks or contradict 
management’s assurances. Thus, their counterbalancing force could be quite 
weak. And if the managers identify with the foreign investor, the Outside 
Directors may end up echoing the very perspectives they were meant to 
check.  
Many Outside Directors do not enter the board with a professional 
background one would predict would be useful in checking management. 
Though most are former government officials, some enter with a 																																																								
203.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-681, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY: DOD 
CANNOT ENSURE ITS OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS UNDER FOREIGN INFLUENCE IS SUFFICIENT (2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05681.pdf. 
204.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-96-94, DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY: 
WEAKNESSES IN U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN-OWNED DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 
(1996), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155356.pdf. There is little public information about security 
lapses, and so it is not possible to learn whether lapses result from incompetence, corruption, concerted 
effort, or good-faith screw-ups.   
205.  Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–33 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies showing limitations on Outside 
Director effectiveness).  
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background in corporate security services; succeeding in that career path 
involves helping executives to minimize the burdens of national security 
corporate governance, and may dispose the Outside Director to facilitating 
the management’s vision for the company rather than the government’s. 
All this would be less worrisome if DSS could effectively monitor and 
evaluate subject firms, but its ability to do so has been repeatedly 
questioned. In 2005, the GAO wrote a report critical of DSS’s ability to 
ensure compliance.206 As of 2011, DSS claims to be in full compliance with 
the GAO’s recommendations,207 though it would be wrong to end the story 
there. That same year, DSS’s director told his staff, “We have been remiss 
in our fundamental oversight responsibilities to the Department and the U.S. 
Government,” and that it was still necessary to “understand [the] culture of 
failed leadership, lack of accountability and failure to communicate.”208 As 
recently as June of 2014, the DOD inspector general reported that DOD 
currently has “a cumbersome and inefficient process to verify, track, and 
manage relevant contractor documentation.” 209  DOD had no central 
database for Form 254 (a critical document describing the classification 
level for a contract) and relevant documentation, and so it could not share 
database access with other government offices.  
Not only could DSS sometimes miss important compliance breaches 
under these circumstances, it appears to have done so on some occasions. 
One high-profile event concerned development of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter. Beset by delays and cost overruns, the project’s cost may reach 
$200 million per plane,210 so it would be a shame if the security of the “the 
most expensive weapons system ever developed,”211 were compromised by 
early and unauthorized foreign control over crucial steps in design and 
production. Yet, this is what some fear has already occurred. One major 
vendor to the project, BAE, operated under a national security corporate 																																																								
206.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 48. 
207.  Schwellenbach, supra note 19. 
208.  Nick Schwellenbach, DSS Director: Defense Security Service "Remiss" in "Fundamental 
Oversight Responsibilities,” PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/RYD4-CV7J (alteration in original). 
209.  INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REP. NO. DODIG-2014-080, ASSESSMENT OF DOD 
PROCESSES IN SUPPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 
DETERMINATIONS AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR INFLUENCE (FOCI) MITIGATION (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/cfius.pdf. 
210.  The present monetary estimate to build the 2,457 planes is $400 billion, up $200 billion from 
three years ago. Christian Davenport, Air Force Grounds 15 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters Because of 
‘Peeling and Crumbling’ Insulation, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/2EN7-WUMG. 
After construction is done, maintenance and operation costs will add another $1 trillion, raising the per-
plane cost to almost $600 million. Adam Ciralsky, Will It Fly?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:00 
AM), https://perma.cc/8XU9-PQ4A. 
211.  Ciralsky, supra note 210. 
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governance regime that required frequent and detailed disclosures to DSS. 
Instead, BAE withheld security reports from the U.S. government for two 
years, by falsely asserting that the audit reports were somehow 
“privileged.”212 
Even if national security corporate governance were implemented 
without any problems, we may still worry that it is sometimes used where 
stronger measures, such as terminating a contractor, should actually be 
required. Suppose that a contractor takes on an utterly unacceptable foreign 
investor, such that sober analysis would suggest that the contractor can no 
longer be trusted with vital secrets. Still, defense officials have already built 
a relationship with the contractor or determined that the contractor provides 
the best product, so it is understandable that they might embrace national 
security corporate governance as a way to preserve the status quo.213  
The GAO found just that phenomenon: “Security officials from the 
military services told us that their contracting officers are often reluctant to 
terminate ongoing contracts and therefore tend to propose National Interest 
Determinations to retain the contractor's services, without always 
attempting to find other U.S.-owned suppliers.”214 Just as officials may 
demand national security corporate governance without proper regard for 
costs to the contractor, they may accept national security corporate 
governance even when national security corporate governance cannot 
succeed. This is similar to the alien property Custodian’s decision to keep 
potentially traitorous directors on the boards of companies deemed 
important to the war.215  
With any large program, occasional lapses must be expected, so it is not 
possible to conclude that DSS fails more than other agencies. Nor, given the 
information available, is it possible to conclude that national security 
corporate governance’s failures are too costly or readily preventable. 
However, there are reasons to reject a story that national security corporate 
governance’s costs result in a decisively safer contracting program. 
C. Government Independence and Integrity  
Government power over enterprise always permits a degree of rent-
seeking (or, in ordinary language, “corruption”), and lucrative government 																																																								
212.  Dana Hedgpeth, Security of F-35 Jet Secrets Questioned, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, 
https://perma.cc/3SGR-7Y75. 
213.  Cf. Merton J. Peck & Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic 
Analysis, 71 J. Pol. Econ. 302 (1963) (explaining that ex post accountability in the defense sector is 
hampered by a desire to preserve ex ante robust competition). 
214.  See H. Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 107. 
215.  See supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text. 
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contracts tempt businesses to cultivate government decision makers. 216 
Contemporary national security corporate governance is no different. The 
national security corporate governance regime arose in the vacuum left by 
the problematic alien property Custodian regime, and so we must be 
sensitive to it potentially facing similar temptations. 217  
The Outside Directors of FOCI firms tend to be retired military officers 
and intelligence officers. Many are former officials at DSS.218 Much of the 
potential inefficiency in national security corporate governance amounts to 
pressure to hire and retain candidates acceptable to the government. Some 
view the FOCI program as a retirement subsidy, from industry to client, for 
officials whose careers involved industry oversight and procurement. 
Outside Director roles are “highly sought after.”219 Most pay a modest five-
figure stipend, 220  though some directorships may pay $200,000, 221  and 
celebrity Outside Directors may have commanded far more.222 The work 
commitment of board membership is quite modest in many cases, at least 
for the best organized of Outside Directors. 223  As a result, it is quite 
common for an Outside Director to serve on several boards, with some 
serving on ten or more boards. 
A long literature establishes the business prospects firms enjoy by hiring 
government officials. 224  The hire can be quid-pro-quo corruption, the 
tactical hire of an official with the skills and relationships necessary to lobby 
former colleagues, or simply a demonstration of commitment and solidarity 																																																								
216.  Several prominent participants in the DSS program of national security corporate 
governance are also prominent violators of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, having paid large fines to 
settle charges that they bribed foreign governments in exchange for contracts or privileges. See, e.g., 
Roger M. Witten et al., Siemens Agrees to Record-Setting $800 Million in FCPA Penalties, 
WILMERHALE (Dec. 22, 2008), https://perma.cc/TJ6H-N4JY; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BAE 
Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered To Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/3LPT-K7RC. 
217.  See supra Section I.B. 
218.  For example, one recent Director of DSS now serves on three boards. 
219.  Interview with former DSS official (Aug 19, 2015).  
220. Interview with national security governance consultant (July 14, 2015). See also U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 204.  
221.  Interview with former DSS official (June 25, 2015). 
222.  Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security, serves as chairman of the board 
of BAE Systems, where his compensation is likely quite high. Press Release, BAE Systems, The 
Honorable Michael Chertoff Elected Chairman of BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors (Apr. 18, 
2012), https://perma.cc/5Q3H-7PX2. 
223.  A 1996 GAO report discussed a director being paid $50,000 for eight days’ work per year. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 204, at 39. 
224.  Mehmet I. Canayaz, Jose V. Martinez & Han N. Ozsoylev, Is the Revolving Door of 
Washington a Back Door to Excess Corporate Returns? 3 (Econ. Research Forum, Working Paper No. 
1507, 2015) (finding 7.43 percent better return to firms that will soon hire a government official); Mara 
Faccio, Politically Connected Firms, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 369 (2006). 
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with the bureaucracy.225 On this interpretation, national security corporate 
governance may be localized on foreign-owned firms precisely because 
they may lack the understanding and incentives to play the hiring game 
correctly.226  
Given the disparity between private-sector salaries versus those available 
in civil and military service, and given the sums of money with which 
government actors are entrusted, it would be surprising if there were no 
mechanisms by which they can capture rents. In this respect DSS national 
security corporate governance appointments resemble another area of 
remunerated corporate oversight, provided by former government officials: 
corporate board monitorships. 227  As Brandon Garrett and others have 
documented, large corporations are rarely convicted of crimes.228 Instead, 
culpable firms make promises, such as to hire a trusted outsider to watch 
over the company for a few years. Like a contractor appointing an Outside 
Director to mitigate foreign influence, these defendants hire a “monitor” to 
mitigate criminal influence – the key difference is that corporate compliance 
monitors are installed after law breaking, while Outside Directors are 
installed before any form of law breaking.229  																																																								
225.  Even without the requirement of FOCI mitigation, many firms might be wise to hire similar 
officials, for similar corporate jobs, with similar job security. And many in fact do so. National security 
corporate governance is arguably an intensification of choices companies would make even without 
mandate. 
226.  There is not always a direct feedback between hiring an official and being awarded a 
lucrative contract. Nor, from the perspective of the contracting agent, is there a direct link between 
awarding the contract and the firm hiring more former bureaucrats. Fully domestic firms are repeat 
players with reason to invest in long-term reputations for being appreciative and generous, but foreign 
entrants may have difficulty assuring their clients that they will reciprocate with appropriate hiring. A 
foreign firm might never hire government officials, or employ them only for the duration of a single 
project, especially if they return their focus to the primary market. This risk is even higher because so 
many firms find the American version of the revolving-door confusing and different from domestic 
practices.  
Under this interpretation, the lack of business credentials and unparalleled job security of the FOCI 
boards is a feature, not a bug. It allows the foreign firm to render credible its participation in the domestic 
norms of reciprocity. Foreign firms are forced to do what domestic firms would do naturally – reward 
bureaucrats for favorable treatment in obtaining and servicing contracts.  
For this thought, I thank Itai Feigenbau, lecturer from Tel Aviv University. 
227.  There are, of course, important differences between FOCI mitigation & national security 
corporate governance and monitorships. The latter is used for culpable firms, whereas a FOCI firm’s 
only crime is one of national or investor origin. But there are similarities too. Both are motivated by the 
worry that external regulation alone may fail to secure compliance with the law by a high-risk firm. Both 
are semi-contractual governance changes that can be quite inconvenient if the government’s 
representative takes an active role.  
228.  Supra note 16. 
229.  Interestingly, the preemptive installation of inside directors allows them to serve compliance 
functions unavailable to monitors, such as the gatekeeper function. Cf. Root, supra note 16, at 526 
(arguing that monitors are unable to lend reputational capital, to certify that a corporation is compliant, 
because they arrive too late at the firm). See also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (describing the gatekeeper function). By arriving before 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/5
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A corporate compliance monitor will tend to be a former prosecutor – 
often a friend of the prosecutor negotiating the agreement.230 For example, 
then-U.S. Attorney Chris Christie famously demanded that a defendant 
company hire former Attorney General John Ashcroft to its board as a 
monitor and pay him at least $1.5 million per month.231  
Concerns about cozy corporate monitorships led to Congressional 
hearings and a policy memorandum by the Acting Deputy Attorney 
General. The result was a professionalizing of the monitor selection process. 
Now, the relevant prosecutors “may not make, accept, or veto the selection 
of monitor candidates unilaterally.” 232  Instead, monitor candidates are 
considered by a standing ad hoc committee within the Department of 
Justice233 and approved by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. 234 
Where practical, a pool of three acceptable monitors should be submitted 
by the government to the corporation. 235 
Relative to contemporary monitorship practices, national security 
corporate governance suffers from a less open process. DSS retains veto 
power over candidates, there is little transparency, and there are few 
professionalizing checks, such as a standing committee, to limit the whims 
of a particular official.  
It is understandable that DSS agents might be chosen less publicly than 
DOJ monitors. Moreover, DSS denies that it ever proposes a particular 
candidate; the company is tasked with finding acceptable directors and 
proxy holders. Nevertheless, we should be cognizant of the risks inherent in 
opacity. 																																																								
wrongdoing, Outside Directors can certify to the government that the corporation is compliant on pain 
of losing their own sterling reputation. An interesting suggestion is that corporate monitors might be 
installed before any wrongdoing in order to assure constituents of their good faith compliance.  
230.  Morford Memo Morphed: Who Picks the Corporate Monitors?, CORP. CRIME REP. (Jan. 1 
2013, 11:33 AM), https://perma.cc/ML6H-CUT3 (“‘This ensures that the monitor comes from the boys 
club,’ said one monitor who was briefed on the matter by high ranking Criminal Division officials but 
who asked not to be identified. In FCPA cases where Main Justice alums in DC firms represent most of 
the companies under investigation, they recommend each other for the monitorships.”). But see Veronica 
Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG 109 (2016) (describing the many varieties of 
monitorships).  
231.  Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, 
at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/washington/10justice.html. 
232.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 
163 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-163-selection-and-use-monitors. 
233.  “Each United States Attorney's Office and Department component shall create a standing or 
ad hoc committee (‘Committee’) of prosecutors to consider the selection or veto, as appropriate, of 
monitor candidates. The Committee should, at a minimum, include the office ethics advisor, the Criminal 
Chief of the United States Attorney's Office or relevant Section Chief of the Department component, 
and at least one other experienced prosecutor.” Id. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Morford Memo Morphed, supra note 230. 
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’S LESSONS 
With some handle now on the operation of national security corporate 
governance as well as its plausible costs and benefits, this Part seeks to place 
national security corporate governance into broader context. First, it notes 
tendency of scholars and policymakers to downplay the corporate 
governance implications of their prescriptions and to press national security 
over competing priorities, neglecting the complex relationship between 
these areas. Second, it looks again at the national security corporate 
governance regime to draw some tentative conclusions about how it could 
better achieve its ends in light of the discussion. Third, it asks whether 
national security corporate governance and like techniques could sometimes 
be useful in non-security contexts, such as addressing financial risk. Finally, 
it examines whether national security corporate governance has something 
to say about shareholder primacy, codetermination, staggered boards and 
other changes to orthodox American corporate governance.  
A. How to Balance Security and Governance? 
The national security corporate governance regime privileges national 
security without much concern for its impact on corporate governance and 
efficiency. This is not a unique phenomenon. Without constant vigilance, 
national security concerns have a tendency to supplant other values,236 such 
as civil liberties,237 representative government,238 and transparency.239  
This general tendency may be even stronger when it is only corporate 
governance at stake on the other side. Government officials and scholars 
																																																								
236.  Even the scale or likelihood of the national security threat may become irrelevant. See 
generally, RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS 
ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 62 (2006) (Vice President Dick Cheney said, “If there's a one percent chance that 
Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a 
certainty in terms of our response.”). Yet many of us would consider a one percent chance of certain 
threats to be insufficient to jettison all other values.  
237.  See Francis Cardinal George, Civil Liberties vs. National Security: The Enduring Tension, 
19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2005).  
238.  Marcus G. Raskin, Democracy Versus the National Security State, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 189, 220 (1976).  
239.  Pieter D. Wezeman & Siemon T. Wezeman, Balancing Transparency and National Security, 
STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. (Jan. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/YER5-XS8G; Patricia L. Bellia, 
WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L. J. 1448 
(2012). See also Dianne Feinstein, Commentary, Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act, WALL. 
ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487039890 
04575653280626335258. 
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alike tend to overlook corporate law niceties,240 particularly when crafting 
defense and investment policy.241 Why? 
One possibility is that corporate law problems are less salient than 
national security problems. It is a well-known finding of behavioral 
economics literature that individuals tend to overweigh the importance of 
low-probability catastrophes, such as terrorism.242 By contrast, the harms of 
bad governance often appear slowly, and on a company’s balance sheet. It 
is hard to imagine a less salient problem, given widespread financial 
illiteracy.  
Another possible explanation is the general willingness of policymakers, 
and some scholars, to impose burdens on corporations.243 Someone pays for 
ineffective corporate governance, but it is not self-evident who or how 
much.244 Tax scholars have long noted that the corporate tax is attractive to 
lawmakers because no one really knows who ultimately pays it. 245 																																																								
240.  E.g., Yair Listokin argues in a forthcoming article that when corporate law conflicts with 
systemic risk regulation, corporate law should succumb every time. He would suspend the rights and 
protections normally accorded to shareholders whenever managers or the government see a major 
systemic risk problem. As he writes, “During financial crises, the normal conventions of corporate law 
do not apply.” Yair J. Listokin & Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial 
Crisis, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author). 
241.  See, e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 46. Professors Gilson and Milhaupt proposed a 
“minimalist” approach to defanging sovereign wealth funds—bar them from voting their shares. Despite 
the article’s many virtues, Gilson and Milhaupt do not ask whether this proposal might pose efficiency 
costs by undermining accountability systems. Due to their expertise and substantial ownership, 
institutional investors play an important role in disciplining management. Eliminating some institutional 
investors from oversight should weaken corporate governance and performance. It is not sufficient to 
say that voting rights return to a subsequent domestic purchaser of shares. Id. The costs of poor 
governance are borne as long and until that transfer takes place. Id. Of course, many institutional 
investors are quite passive in exercising their rights, and even large institutions rarely own enough to 
make sweeping changes. By contrast, the FOCI context tends to arise when the foreign investor owns a 
substantial stake.  
242.  Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 
(2002). 
243.  It is perhaps fitting that Michael Oxley, the author of the eponymous Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which extensively federalized corporate governance, now serves on a FOCI board as a proxy holder. See 
Steve Lindquist, Industrial Policy and Programs, DSS ACCESS (Def. Security Serv., Washington, D.C.), 
2012, at 8, https://perma.cc/247A-WH24 .  
244.  One might argue that similar thinking has led to the use of corporate disclosure regulation 
to regulate other contentious social issues, such as executive pay and human rights abuses in foreign 
countries.  
245.  Compare, e.g., MIHIR A. DESAI, C. FRITZ FOLEY & JAMES R. HINES, JR., LABOR AND 
CAPITAL SHARES OF THE CORPORATE TAX BURDEN: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE (2008) (workers and 
investors share the tax), and Matthew H. Jensen & Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 131 TAX NOTES 1083 (2011), https://perma.cc/4AP4-SPBL (arguing 
that 50 percent or more of the tax falls on workers), with ROSANNE ALTSHULER, BENJAMIN HARRIS & 
ERIC TODER, CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION AND PROGRESSIVITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010), 
https://perma.cc/2A5A-33EG  (arguing that the tax mostly falls on workers), and Alan J. Auerbach, Who 
Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11787, 2006) (describing conditions under which investors bear much of the cost).  
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Corporate law scholars have likewise noted this tendency in federal 
regulation of corporations. Lawmakers may underestimate the cost of 
mandating corporate governance rules246 or they may simply not care about 
the costs. 247  This tendency makes it unsurprising that governance 
modifications might be tolerated for the promise of security gains, even 
without a sense of the costs.  
Of course, the most important reason that we disregard corporate law is 
probably just the sense that national security is much more compelling. 
“Salus populi suprema lex esto.”248 National security promises freedom 
from fear and injury, and it addresses existential threats to the nation. By 
contrast, corporate law’s promises depend upon the maintenance of national 
and international order. Moreover, corporate law’s blessings are 
instrumental. When it works well, it tends to enhance shareholder welfare, 
which is only contingently linked to the general welfare.249 Shareholders 
may prosper when towering monopolies choke off competition,250 procure 
favorable regulation by lobbying251 or bribery,252 deal roughly with workers 
and the environment,253 and take excessive risks at the expense of creditors 
or society as a whole.254  
And yet, corporate law supports effective and efficient enterprises, which 
are crucial to America’s admixture of public and private defense 																																																								
246.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER 
PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 39 (2006) (underestimating 
the cost of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by an order of magnitude). See Roberta Romano, Does 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future? 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 239–54 (2009) (summarizing post-
enactment cost assessments of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
247.  See, e.g., Romano, supra note 205 (noting the lack of concern for, or knowledge of, the cost 
of regulatory intervention in corporate governance).  
248.  This notion, meaning roughly that the safety of the people must be the supreme law, finds 
wide support among a diverse set of political philosophers. See, e.g., MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE 
LEGIBUS 466–67 (Clinton W. Keyes trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1929); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE 
ON GOVERNMENT (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-
POLITICAL TREATISE (1670). 
249.  Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or 
Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 101 (2015); Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices 
in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 187 (1988) (arguing that bargaining behavior in the 
corporate takeover context are a deadweight loss from a societal perspective). 
250.  Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 560-66 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part). 
251.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 355-356 (2010); Elizabeth 
Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009). 
252.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/4K3H-
F2H4 (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
253.  Judd F. Snierson, The Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 541, 548-556 (2011). 
254.  Richard Ridyard, Toward a Bank Shareholder-Oriented Model: Using Double Liability to 
Mitigate Excessive Risk-Taking, 2 U.C. LONDON J.L. & JURIS. 141, 147-49 (2013) (explaining 
managerial incentives for risk taking). 
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procurement. If national security is advanced in ways that displace 
governance best practices, the government will find fewer or more 
expensive partners. Just as corporate law presupposes adequate national 
security, the American approach to national security presupposes adequate 
corporate law for contractors.  
The dynamic and complex relationship between these values 
problematizes any simple hierarchy of importance and renders baseless the 
claim that national security should always trump corporate law. In fact, 
national security’s relationship to corporate law is contingent and complex. 
Study of national security corporate governance suggests that practicable 
security policy requires both regulation of and solicitude toward private 
ordering. 
Recognizing that national security corporate governance likely has some 
place in a strategy of national defense, but that we may have a tendency to 
underweight the damage done to governance, the following two Sections 
contemplate ways to meld the two spheres in a more effective and nuanced 
manner.  
B. When To Pursue Security Through Governance? 
 First, the actual use of FOCI mitigation and national security corporate 
governance should probably be narrow. The cost of national security 
corporate governance may be quite high and the security actually achieved 
is sometimes questionable. 255  Moreover, national security corporate 
governance provides an excuse to avoid the painful, but sometimes 
necessary, cutting of ties to an unacceptably risky contractor.256 
Narrowing the scope is also suggested by the changing character of 
security risks.257 Less and less do information leaks come from executives 
passing envelopes to foreign owners—instead, they are unintentional 
breaches caused by cyber-attacks.258  Every day, American firms face a 
barrage of phishing, malware, and other cyber espionage. Cyber thieves do 
not solely target foreign-owned firms, nor does insulating or factionalizing 
the board prevent hackers or phishing scams. Focusing too greatly on 
national security corporate governance may distract attention from the real 
and urgent threat to all contracting firms.  
																																																								
255.  See supra Part III.A-B.  
256.  Schwellenbach, supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
257.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
258.  See DEF. SEC. SERV., supra note 31, at 27. 
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In many cases, the government would do better to make a genuinely risk-
based assessment. 259  Some “foreign” firms have a long history of 
compliance and probably can comply with security laws of general 
application. Others are sufficiently risky that FOCI mitigation provides 
unjustified comfort—it is better to do without some contractors if they 
cannot be trusted.  
Whether restricting the use of national security corporate governance for 
foreign firms or increasing its application for some domestic firms or 
foreign non-contractors, it is the government’s responsibility to take stock 
of the costs it likely imposes. This is true even though national security 
corporate governance is mostly voluntary and so firms may decline (or 
divest) foreign investment if they would rather not comply with national 
security corporate governance. One might be tempted to impose national 
security corporate governance widely and let firms opt out if they find it too 
costly.  
The reason that the government must consider the cost of the program is 
that it likely bears it. Many government contracts are formally or 
functionally cost-plus contracts. Only in a world of fantastic waste would 
cost play no part in pricing. If the government requests a strange governance 
structure, the government is likely to see part of the cost of the structure 
reflected in the size of the bill charged or quality of goods rendered, so the 
government must thoughtfully predict whether this security is worth the 
cost, on the front end, as it does with other product features.260  
 Even if the contract is not cost-plus, use of national security corporate 
governance is often rewarded by preferential bidding status. National 
security corporate governance can help contractors to qualify as small 
businesses (despite having massive parent companies) due to their 
substantial independence. 261  Dubbing a contractor worthy of national 																																																								
259.  It is expected that the new versions of the NISPOM will increasingly adopt a risk-based 
approach.  
260.  Sometimes the government can involuntarily impose national security corporate 
governance. For example, a company might invest large sums of money in project-specific assets, only 
to be told during the project that security needs have changed, and the project is now too sensitive to be 
handled by foreigners. To continue on the project, the contractor will have to accept FOCI migration. 
Sometimes, a company is even told that they will require the most severe insulating mitigation. In these 
cases, the government ex post expropriates additional security and externalizes the cost onto the 
contractor. Insofar as the government does not directly bear the cost of national security corporate 
governance, it sets a more problematic chain in motion. If it does this widely and without restraint, 
contractors will be understandably reluctant to deal with the government on any project and will charge 
more accordingly. A reputation for judicious use of national security corporate governance only in cases 
where it actually pays its way makes the government a better contracting partner throughout. 
261. Kyung M. Song, Foreign Workers for U.S. Jobs a Rarity at Boeing, THE SEATTLE TIMES 
(May 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5FDL-FK67. 
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security corporate governance is also a decision to disqualify many of its 
competitors for a project, or allow the contractor to seize projects intended 
to support genuinely small contractors. Again, the government must decide 
whether extra security justifies reduced competition among bidders.  
Second, while the actual use of national security corporate governance 
should narrow, the potential scope for national security corporate 
governance should probably grow. National security corporate governance 
is used where firms pose special security threats in large part because their 
shareholders may have geopolitical motives or see profits in excessive risk, 
but those criteria are not limited to foreign firms. National security corporate 
governance should be potentially available even in cases with entirely 
American shareholders, so long as the incentives are such that shareholders 
might tolerate treasonous geopolitics in the search for profits. Some 
domestic contractors employ many foreign nationals, source large parts of 
their supply chain abroad, and do an increasing amount of business 
overseas.  
For example, Boeing does half of its engineering work in Russia and 
other nations,262 will make fighter jets in India,263 sells 70 percent of its 
commercial aircraft outside of the United States, 264  and has billions of 
dollars worth of military sales.265 Overall, Boeing made more than half of 
its revenue from non-U.S. sales.266 Arguably, Boeing faces greater risks of 
foreign influence and pressure than a Maryland company that happens to 
have a few Canadians or Cayman Island hedge funds among its 
shareholders. Yet, Boeing is not even potentially subject to the FOCI 
regime. At least in theory, DSS should be able to use national security 
corporate governance and other tools to manage information security risks 
at nominally domestic firms like Boeing.  
Likewise, the potential scope of national security corporate governance 
should also be widened in light of its second goal, industrial readiness.267 
Insofar as national security corporate governance helps prepare for 
managerial changes after expropriation, it should be potentially available at 
any firm that would be realistically expropriated at wartime. Presumably 																																																								
262.  Id. 
263.  Vikram Chandra, What Boeing May ‘Make In India’: Fighter Plane, Choppers, NDTV (Oct. 
16, 2015, 3:40 PM), https://perma.cc/X6WA-67NF. 
264.  See Close Relationships with Global Stakeholders are Key, BOEING INT’L, 
https://perma.cc/3ED2-3Y9C (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
265.  Clay Dillow, U.S. Companies are Making a Killing on Foreign Military Sales, FORTUNE 
(May 11, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/11/foreign-military-sales/. 
266.  BOEING, LEADING AHEAD: THE BOEING COMPANY 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/8LCM-PC6S (stating “non-U.S. customers accounted for approximately 58% of [its] 
revenue”).  
267.  See supra part I.B.  
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wartime expropriation strategies would cover more than just foreign-owned 
military contractors. 268  Perhaps, as in the past, many foreign-owned 
industrial facilities would be expropriated, or perhaps the Pentagon keeps 
(or could keep) a more detailed list. In either case, transition planning 
remains a valuable, if covert, objective of national security corporate 
governance, and that should be reflected in the potential jurisdiction of the 
program. 
C. How Should We Govern for Security? 
Cost-sensitivity also means that when national security corporate 
governance is used, agreements should be drafted with sensitivity to the 
unique situation of the complying company. At present, DSS prefers to use 
the same few templates for all national security corporate governance, with 
as few modifications as possible, in order to ease its monitoring burden. 
While this is understandable, a greater investment in staffing, to allow more 
nuanced national security corporate governance plans, would likely pay 
dividends. If these templates are calibrated to deal well with some 
companies, they may be overly strict for some and overly lax for others. In 
many cases, a bespoke agreement might better achieve security and 
efficiency goals than an off-the-rack agreement. 
Another option is openness to incentive pay.269 While much of national 
security corporate governance seeks to sunder directors and shareholders, 
directorial shareholding may sometimes reduce both inefficiency and 
geopolitically motivated risk. A firm that shares secrets with a rogue nation 
will be fined and excluded from future government contracts—hardly 
attractive for a director holding unvested stock.270 While it is notoriously 
challenging to implement sensible incentive compensation programs, 																																																								
268.  The actual content of the list, as well as the conditions for conclusion and the publicity of its 
membership, is both important and beyond the scope of the Article.  
269.  Professor Charles Elson and others have long argued that directors should be compensated 
not with cash or stock options, but with stock. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron 
Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 859 (2003) (issuing a "call 
for truly independent, equity-owning directors as the solution to the governance conundrum raised by 
Enron and other corporate debacles"); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based 
Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 944 (1993) (proposing that "corporations . . . pay their directors their 
annual fees in restricted company stock"); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive 
Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 371 (2009); 
Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 
266–67 (2008) (stating that board ownership of shares correlates to company performance). 
270.  Even when it is economically rational to risk upsetting American clients, the benefits will 
often accrue to the parent company or an overseas subsidiary. A director of the U.S. subsidiary, which 
obtains all of its business from federal agencies, will have an incentive to protect the subsidiary even in 
those cases, so long as her stock is subsidiary stock. As a practical matter, many subsidiaries will not 
have their own stock, however.  
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particularly at private companies and subsidiaries,271 it is no indictment that 
incentive compensation is presently rare among Outside Directors and 
proxyholders. Contractors under FOCI are principally concerned with 
DSS’s approval, without which they cannot do business. Conservativism is 
rational in such a context. However, some contractors may be willing to 
experiment with incentive pay if DSS preemptively signals openness to the 
effort.  
D. Should We Pursue Other Values through Governance? 
Progressive legal scholars have long wished the boardroom to welcome 
values other than shareholder wellbeing. They have lamented America’s 
unwillingness to try arrangements such as Germany’s scheme of mandatory 
codetermination, in which workers elect almost half the board of the 
company. National security corporate governance reminds us that we 
occasionally try such things in America too, 272  and we could go 
considerably further.  
National security corporate governance also suggests altogether new 
ways to deemphasize shareholder wealth maximization, for those so 
inclined. Beyond positive steps to empowering neglected constituencies, we 
can take negative steps to disempower shareholders. Recall that almost a 
quarter of the companies subject to national security corporate governance 
have only national-security oriented directors. If we wish to protect workers, 
we do not have to imagine co-determination, the regime of approximate 
sharing between capital and labor.273 Instead, we can actually replace the 
whole board with a slate of labor-backed representatives. If shareholders 
agitate for dividends rather than systemic risk-reducing cushion, we can 
anesthetize ordinary board functions, insulating existing directors from 
elections and exempting them from state law fiduciary duties.274 
																																																								
271.  Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in 
Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 715 (2011). 
272.  American states increasingly permit the incorporation of firms with an explicit, board-level 
mandate to pursue non-profit-maximizing social goals. See generally, Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social 
Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 92 (2017). 
273.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, 
Systemically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1365 (2017) (discussing co-determination). 
274.  See Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (describing the case of 
Amtrak, a company owned by private shareholders and statutorily required to seek profits, whose 
board is not selected by common stockholders and is entrusted with several non-profit goals); see also, 
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 588 n.331 
(2015). The government also selects board members Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve. See supra notes 227–235 and accompanying text. 
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We had better be serious though. As corporate traditionalists have 
predicted, these are costly steps in terms of efficiency and they may tend to 
enrich managers and bureaucrats along the way. Many of us care about 
workers, the environment, and other causes enough to support external 
regulation, but not enough to dismantle the orthodox system of governing 
enterprise.275 Such reluctance may be read as a lack of concern for the 
causes. National security may be the rare test case for non-corporate values 
and structures displacing the regnant private ordering precisely because we 
are unequivocal about its importance.  
Are there other areas of widespread concern, where national security 
corporate governance could guide our thinking about new strategies for 
achieving public goals? If there is a non-security area where national 
security corporate governance-like strategies may be most attractive, it is in 
systemic financial risk.  
Warren Buffet called swaps “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
and perhaps the metaphor can be explored. 276  Like national security, 
systemic financial risk entails asymmetric risks with terrific public costs. 
Also, financial firms may tolerate or seek great risks at their shareholders’ 
implicit urging. Investors in large firms may find it individually rational 
(though collectively irrational) for managers to make speculative bets, write 
swaps that they cannot satisfy, and retain little or no capital.  
Kristin Johnson has proposed that boards of directors of some financial 
institutions be required to add a monitor, charged with protecting against 
systemic risk.277 Professor Johnson suggests that the monitor would attend 
board meetings but not have the power to vote.278  Going even further, 
Professor Steven Schwarcz argues that bondholders ought to get a voting 
minority position on corporate boards, both in recognition of the 
vulnerability of this important creditor class and in order to reduce arguably 
excessive risk taking.279  																																																								
275.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 186. 
276.  Lucinda Shen, Warren Buffet Just Unloaded $195 Million Worth of These Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/08/mass-destruction-buffett-
derivatives/. 
277.  Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
185, 241 (2013). Other articles have urged the imposition of a public-regarding duty on directors of 
systemically important firms, though without necessarily altering the composition of the board itself. 
See e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries Special? 68 ALA. L. REV. 1071 (2017); Saule T. 
Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share” Approach, 68 ALA. L. REV. 
1029 (2017); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1 (2016).  
278.  Johnson, supra note 277. 
279.  Schwarcz, supra note 273, at 1345, 1363–66 (advocating for bondholder representation on 
boards). 
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Perhaps such arrangements would reduce systemic risk, but so far neither 
proposal has garnered significant support. Such cases become stronger 
when likened to national security corporate governance for financial risks. 
While both Johnson’s and Schwarcz’s proposals are ambitious, neither is 
unprecedented. We are already in the business of installing constituency 
directors with an eye to non-shareholder value.  
We can also consider the case for non-shareholder directors in light of 
succession planning. Dodd-Frank calls for systemically important firms to 
engage in explicit succession planning, crafting “living wills.” These plans 
have been criticized on various fronts. It is difficult to craft a realistic plan 
for winding up one’s enterprise, much less to make that plan dynamic, 
public, and credible. Worse yet, honest succession plans (or honest reactions 
to them from regulators) could spark a panic. Could implicit succession 
planning be a better approach? 
In the 2008 financial crisis, the government came to control numerous 
firms, such as AIG and GM. The government had to call the shots for these 
companies with the immediate goal of keeping the economy operational. 
This is not unlike wartime expropriation of crucial industrial infrastructure.  
Many problems occurred as a result of government control over these 
firms. One controversial decision was to authorize large bonuses at firms 
that had only recently gotten bailouts.280 The bonuses were justified on the 
theory that they were necessary to retain top talent—talent, which may have 
recently helped cause the crisis but now, due to their own culpability in the 
toxic assets, had the only hope of understanding and unraveling it. There 
was, in short, a dearth of experienced and loyal employees, and the 
government had to pick between operational effectiveness and 
trustworthiness. Far better if several members of the board, representing the 
public interest, stood ready to take the reins at a time of national crisis. 
Monitors of the sort Johnson describes could serve this function. 
Recognizing that a financial crisis creates expropriation scenarios akin to 
those of wartime makes more plausible the use of wartime preparations and 
solutions. 281  																																																								
280.  Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html; Matt 
Taibbi, Secrets and Lies of the Bailout, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.rollingstone. 
com/politics/news/secret-and-lies-of-the-bailout-20130104.  
281.  While this section has discussed monitors for financial risk, the line quickly blurs between 
this novel use and the traditional national security purpose of national security corporate governance. In 
August 2008, a teetering Lehman Brothers once explored a fire sale to Korean investors. The Story of 
How Lehman’s Last-Minute Korean Rescue Fell Apart, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 10:46 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/16/the-story-of-how-lehmans-last-minute-korean-rescue-fell-
apart/. As David Zaring notes, this transaction would have been subject to CFIUS review. Zaring, supra 
note 103. Such review could not possibly have concluded under the bank’s short fuse. If Lehman were 
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We can also think of it as a sort of expropriation when creditors seize 
control over a company, as they do through the bankruptcy process when a 
firm is insolvent. Perhaps the presence on the board of creditor 
representatives long before insolvency is broached would help ease the 
transition into and out of bankruptcy. Thus, the succession planning and 
expropriation lens provides another argument in support of creditor 
representation on boards.282 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate law and national security law envision fundamentally 
different forms of coordination. Corporate law supports private ordering and 
accountability, particularly of managers to shareholders, in pursuit of profits 
and efficiency. National security law provides for the common defense, 
even if it means tolerating a measure of secrecy, coercion and bureaucracy.  
Both bodies of law govern distinct spheres of activity, and so there is 
seldom any need to reconcile their dissonant logics. We are untroubled that 
corporate directors in Delaware operate with completely different 
constraints than CIA agents in Kabul. Nevertheless, questions at the 
borderland of corporate law and national security law may call forth 
multiple and conflicting answers, raising challenging questions of 
interaction and priority.  
Defense contractors travel that borderland. Private companies provide 
personnel for armed combat, 283  transport captives for extraordinary 
rendition284 and conduct interrogations themselves.285 They build the navy’s 
																																																								
already subject to a form of national security corporate governance, a fast track CFIUS approval might 
have been available. See supra notes 101–07. 
282.  Schwarcz, supra note 273. 
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contractor to non-contractor increased by a factor of ten between the Gulf War and the war in Iraq). See 
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missiles286 and write the NSA’s data gathering software.287 Contractors are 
participants in national security, but they are also corporations subject to 
corporate law.  
What is the relationship between corporate law and national security in 
that domain? Corporate law supports manager accountability to 
shareholders. If this improves the effectiveness of defense contracting firms, 
then it may permit the government to buy better defense capacity on the 
same budget. Conversely, shareholders may push for direct or immediate 
gains, even if it endangers America.288 
National security corporate governance modifies governance and 
operation structures. It creates opportunities for wasteful management to 
exploit shareholders, and it tempts government officials to favor foreign 
firms in the hopes of lucrative retirement jobs on the boards of FOCI firms.  
Yet, it does arguably solve problems. It reduces the risks inherent in 
contracting with foreign-influenced enterprises. More interestingly and 
subtly, it provides a channel for increased government influence and a 
preparatory field for possible wartime industrial efficiency. The 
arrangement looks more favorable when such tail risks are considered. 
National security corporate governance has a secret ambition as a 
succession-planning tool, allowing the government to better control 
captured assets in times of emergency. 
Whatever its merits or costs, national security corporate governance has 
eluded careful study. Military contractors are situated at the intersection of 
security and governance, public and private, safety and efficiency. They 
encompass both, and national security corporate governance is one vision 
of how to reconcile them. It is rarely appropriate to balance two values by 
ignoring the importance of one, and national security corporate governance 
proves that point again. At the same time, national security corporate 
governance reminds us that debates about the form of corporate governance, 
whether it should encompass or exclude non-shareholder priorities, need not 
be conducted in hypothetical terms, since there are cases to consider in the 
military contractor space. 																																																								
286.  Richard Krushnic & Jonathan Alan King, Meet the Private Corporations Building Our 
Nuclear Arsenal, THE NATION (Sept. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/RC3M-GUXP.  
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Ultimately, national security corporate governance is a study in the 
tension between security and governance, and in how our law manages that 
complex relationship. When the subject is national security, all explanations 
are underdetermined. Too much is classified or hidden to objectively assess 
national security corporate governance for its own sake or as a window into 
other potentialities. But, the stakes are also too high not to draw what 
conclusions we can.  
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